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PART I: THE NATURE OF HOSPITAL CONFLICT
I. INTRODUCTION
Conflict within and among health care institutions is increasing
as the result of major structural and economic shifts in the health care
sector. The vast majority of these conflicts never reach the threshold
of formal mechanisms for dispute management (such as litigation,
formal grievance procedures, or hospital bioethics committees), yet
there is reason to believe that they are a major source of stress and
concern for health care workers.2 Despite their ubiquity and impor-
tance, such conflicts have been very little studied. Recent efforts to
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address health care audiences about them have depended largely on
anecdotal evidence and on extrapolating from research on other
forms of social conflict.'
The current study seeks to increase our understanding of the na-
ture and dynamics of health care conflict by focusing on a group of
health care professionals within an urban teaching hospital with a rep-
utation as skilled, if informal, conflict "mediators." While there is
compelling evidence that the use of third party mediators is an effec-
tive tool for the constructive management of conflict,4 little of this
research has occurred in health care settings, and even less of it has
focused on persons who do not formally occupy the mediation role.5
In many workplace settings, however, such emergent mediators ap-
pear to be a large, if untapped, source of social wisdom about conflict
and its management.6 We assumed that this would be true about
health care conflict as well and that by making this knowledge explicit
it could be more easily harnessed to important purposes, such as the
Depndency Care: Conflicts of Loyalties and their Consequences for Patient Care, 5 SCANDINAVIAN J.
CARING SCI. 149, 152-53 (1991).
3. See PHYLLIS BECK KRITEK, NEGOTIATING AT AN UNEVEN TABLE: A PRACTICAL APPROACH
TO WORKING WITH DIFFERENCE AND DIVERSITY (1994); see also LEONARD J. MARCUS ET AL.,
RENEGOTIATING HEALTH CARE: RESOLVING CONFLICT TO BUILD COLLABORATION (1995).
4. Kenneth Kressel & Dean G. Pruitt, Conclusion: A Research Perspective on the Mediation
of Social Conflict, in MEDIATION RESEARCH: THE PROCESS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THIRD-PARTY
INTERVENTION 394, 395-400 (1989) (explaining the effectiveness of mediation in conflict
resolution as compared to other dispute resolution forums); see also Kenneth Kressel, Medi-
ation, in THE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 522, 523-24.
5. See LISA FELD & PETER A. SIMM, MEDIATING PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT COMPLAINTS
1-13 (1998) (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of complaint resolution by medi-
ation versus discipline); see also Thomas B. Meltzoff et. al., Empirical Perspectives on Mediation
and Malpractice, 60 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 107-09 (1997) (examining an initiative
in North Carolina to implement mandated mediation and alternative dispute resolution as
an alternative to malpractice litigation); Evert van de Vleirt, Helpless Helpers: An Intergroup
Conflict Intervention, 6 THE INT'L J. OF CONFLICT MGMT 91 (1995) (reporting a case study of
his structured intervention to assist two warring mental health teams);Johanna Shapiro, A
Visit to the Doctor: An Illustration of Implicit Meanings in the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 6 FAM.
SYSTEMS MED. 276 (1988) (discussing her efforts to assist a third year medical resident to
develop a more effective way of helping a conflicted married couple care for their disabled,
chronically ill child); Jean Ann Seago, Culture of Troubled Work Groups, 26 J. oF NURSING
ADMIN. 41, 44 (1996) (reporting a survey of 115 nurse managers and administrators on the
strategies they used to manage "troubled" nursing work groups).
6. Deborah M. Kolb, Labor Mediators, Managers, and Ombudsmen: Roles Mediators Play in
Different Contexts, in MEDIATION RESEARCH: THE PROCESS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THIRD-PARTY
INTERVENTION 91, 99-107 (1989) (examining how individuals take on the role of mediator
of work place conflict either voluntarily or because of the position that they hold in the
company); see also Blair H. Sheppard, et al., Informal Thirdpartyship: Studies of Eveiyday Con-
flict Intervention, in MEDIATION RESEARCH: THE PROCESS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THIRD-PARTY
INTERVENTION 166 (1989) (examining how informal mediators have more stress on them
than transient third parties because they usually have a relationship with the parties, are a
part of the dispute themselves, and have more options available in conflict resolution).
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training of health care professionals and the design of effective inter-
vention programs.
Our investigation focused on individuals with a reputation for be-
ing skilled conflict managers within a single, 450 bed urban teaching
hospital in the Northeast. The hospital is staffed by approximately 300
attending physicians and has about 600 residents in numerous train-
ing programs. The total number of staff, excluding physicians, is ap-
proximately 2700. The hospital serves a largely minority, lower
socioeconomic population. It is just such hospitals which have been
most negatively impacted by the many changes currently roiling the
delivery of health care services in this country. While focusing on a
single institution places obvious limitations on generalizability, it has
the compensating advantage of providing an in-depth perspective
about conflict dynamics in an important type of health care institu-
tion.
We were interested in answering three major questions: (1) What
types of conflicts do informal hospital conflict managers attempt to
resolve? (2) What do they perceive to be the causes of destructive
conflict in the hospital? (3) What strategies of intervention do they
use and what concepts guide their interventions?
II. METHOD
The investigation took the form of a series of in-depth, semi-struc-
tured interviews with individuals who had a reputation among their
colleagues for expertise in handling conflict in the hospital setting.
We began the process of locating respondents by offering a generic
workshop on conflict management. The 14 attendees were primarily
from middle level management positions. At the end of the workshop
we explained the goals of our study and asked the participants to
nominate individuals who would be appropriate informants because
of their knowledge and skill at handling conflict within the hospital.
This procedure generated the names of three individuals who were
nominated by two or more workshop participants. From that point
forward, additional respondents were located by asking each succes-
sive interviewee to identify other individuals who they felt matched
our criteria of being skilled in dealing with hospital conflict.
This "snowball" approach ultimately yielded a total of 24 individu-
als of whom at least two other members of the hospital community
thought were skilled at managing conflict within the institution. We
stopped seeking additional respondents when new queries yielded fa-
miliar names. We were able to conduct interviews with 17 of the 24
individuals (71%).
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Thirteen of the respondents were women; four were men. The
informants had worked at the hospital for a median of 13 years
(range, from 2 to 22 years) and were in their current positions an
average of 5.75 years (range, 7 months to 15 years). Seven were
nurses, five of whom were managers either of hospital units or large
hospital patient care services, such as Emergency Medicine or Surgery.
Three respondents were physicians (a neurosurgeon, an oncologist,
and a physician director of a medical service), and seven were non-
medical personnel who had significant managerial responsibilities in a
variety of hospital departments, such as social work, legal manage-
ment, ambulatory care, and rehabilitation.
Interviews lasted from one to one and a half hours and were tape
recorded for later transcription. The interview began by defining con-
flict as "any general state of tension or opposition between two or
more individuals or groups, whether or not that tension is openly ex-
pressed." With this broad definition in mind, respondents were first
asked what types of conflicts they had found to be the most vexing at
the institution. For each such conflict the respondent was asked whom
such conflicts were between, what they were about, and what the big-
gest obstacle was to managing that particular type of dispute.
We then asked the respondent to select, for more extended dis-
cussion, a "vexing" conflict in which they had recently been involved.
Respondents were encouraged, although not required, to select a con-
flict in which their involvement had been that of a mediator who had
attempted to assist the disputing individuals or groups to resolve their
differences. We also asked them to select a case which was unique to
health care (e.g., could not just as easily have happened in a school or
a business setting), was difficult to handle, might well have over-
whelmed a novice, and was of interest to them because of what hap-
pened during the conflict or how things turned out at the end. We
did not insist that the respondent select a case in which their interven-
tion had been "successful." Pilot interviews had indicated that health
care professionals were able to identify vexing conflicts which met
these criteria and were comfortable with the case based format of the
interview. Respondents were then asked to describe their interven-
tion and the thinking behind it in three discrete passes. This interview
procedure is based on the "critical decision-method"7 used to study
expert decision-making in real world settings. The concrete details
7. Robert R. Hoffman et al., Use of the Critical Decision Method to Elicit Expert Knowledge:
A Case Study in the Methodology of Cognitive Task Analysis, 40 HUM. FACTORS 254
(1998) (describing the Critical Decision Method implementation and use); GARY KLEIN,
SOURCES OF POWER: How PEOPLE MAKE DECISIONS 189 (1998).
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elicited by this method often provide a richer and more nuanced pic-
ture of how experts approach a problem-domain than is provided by
less structured interview formats.
In the first pass, respondents were asked to provide a brief
description of the parties to the conflict, the nature of the dispute,
how they had become involved, and the eventual outcome. The sec-
ond pass instructed the respondents to describe their actions and
thoughts from their first involvement to the last. This pass generated a
detailed chronology of conflict episodes. The final pass took the re-
spondent over each of these episodes and probed for the respon-
dent's thinking behind any actions taken or decided against, and any
assessments they made about the parties or the dynamics of the dis-
pute. After the final pass, respondents were asked to briefly summa-
rize the major lessons they derived from the case; whether in
hindsight they would do anything differently; what mistakes a novice
might have made; whether they had any important unanswered ques-
tions about the case; and the degree to which the case was typical of
their experience.
The interview ended with questions on several broad topics, in-
cluding the respondents' views on the extent to which the hospital's
urban environment affected either the nature of the conflicts they
had to deal with or the skills needed to be effective; their views on the
importance of training in conflict management for health care profes-
sionals, and aspects of their personal background which they felt
might have influenced their thinking or approach to conflict in health
care.
III. TYPES OF HOSPITAL CONFLICT
Our respondents represent an important, if hidden, social re-
source for the hospital. How does the hospital make use of them?
Judging by the types of conflicts which our informants selected to dis-
cuss during the interview, their expertise appears to be harnessed to
four basic types of conflicts: end of life disputes, conflicts over treat-
ment planning, interpersonal disputes between two individuals, and
organizational conflicts. For each type of conflict we provide a brief
general characterization and illustrate it with one or two case exam-
ples. We begin with the two types of conflicts which are unique to the
health care setting.
[VOL. 5:364
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A. End of Life Conflicts (3)8
These are conflicts which occurred around terminal illnesses.
Two of the cases in this category were "classic" bioethical conflicts, in
which the parties held opposing views as to whether or not extraordi-
nary measures should continue. The conflicts involved either a physi-
cian and family members or a disagreement within a family. Our
informants, serving either as the hospital bereavement specialist or a
member of the hospital's bioethics committee, mediated resolutions
designed to insure that the wishes of the patient or legally empowered
guardian were respected. The final case was a much condensed varia-
tion of a bereavement intervention in which a nurse manager defused
a volatile situation involving an angry group of teenage gang members
who had come to the hospital to see a dying comrade.
All three cases were handled successfully in the sense that our
respondents were satisfied that they had helped find a resolution in
which the dignity and wishes of the dying person and family were
respected. In comparison to the other types of conflicts described to
us, interventions in end of life conflicts were more clearly structured,
generally took less time, and relied upon interveners with more clearly
articulated ideas about the dynamics of the conflict and what was re-
quired of them to manage it successfully.
The Unwilling Daughter. The parties in conflict were the attending
physician and medical staff and the adult daughter of an 89 year old
woman with advanced cancer. The daughter repeatedly pressed the
medical staff to take extraordinary measures to keep her mother alive
against medical advice. The mother had an advanced directive which
named another daughter as her health care proxy. The proxy daugh-
ter agreed with the physician that extraordinary measures should be
stopped.
Over the course of two or three days our respondent, in her role
as an advanced practice nurse bereavement specialist, was able to get
all the parties to agree to the cessation of extraordinary measures.
Her major interventions involved a meeting with the attending physi-
cian who had called for her help; two bedside meetings with the
daughter who was insisting that all measures be taken; a meeting with
the proxy daughter and her husband; and a final group meeting in-
volving all family members, the physician, and a clergyman who had
been invited to provide emotional support to the daughter who was
unwilling to have the extraordinary measures ended. At this final
8. Numbers in parentheses indicate the number of cases in each category. The details
of cases have sometimes been changed to protect anonymity.
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meeting a plan for terminating the extraordinary measures was
worked out in deference to the medical realities of the situation and
the medical directive. The daughter who had been against this step
was given an important measure of emotional support and was in-
volved in deciding how to say "goodbye" to her mother.
The Gang in the Surgical Intensive Care Unit (SICU). A group of
more than 20 angry and unruly teenage gang members had come to
the hospital to see a comrade who had been fatally wounded in a gang
fight. The gang's presence on the unit was preventing the grieving
family from being with their dying son, upsetting the SICU staff, and
creating a potentially explosive situation.
In the span of about 20 minutes, the respondent, a trauma nurse
who had been called from her work in the ER by the anxious SICU
secretary, developed a plan for the orderly departure from the hospi-
tal of the gang members. Her major intervention involved an im-
promptu meeting in the visitors lounge with the gang members. At
this meeting she provided sobering information about their friend's
fatal wounds and enlisted their cooperation and the cooperation of
the angry SICU nurses in a plan for the gang to say a final farewell to
their friend and to exit the hospital gracefully.
B. Conflicts Over Treatment Planning (4)
These are conflicts which occurred when major decisions had to
be made about patient care. Two were conflicts about transferring a
patient to another facility and two were about recommended treat-
ments in the hospital. The conflicts surfaced when there was sharp
disagreement involving the family or patient on one side and the hos-
pital on the other. One of these conflicts also involved a disagreement
among several hospital services over who should be responsible for
the patient's care; and another involved two physicians with very dif-
ferent medical opinions about how to treat an active drug abuser with
advanced cancer.
Although they acted as third parties in these conflicts, the respon-
dents did not serve as mediators. In three of the disputes the respon-
dent's role was to coordinate communication or decision-making
among the affected parties or to serve as a consultant to a hospital
department. In the remaining case the respondent physician was her-
self one of the disputing parties.
The treatment conflicts went on for extended periods - weeks to
months - and were relatively complex, involving many parties and nu-
merous interventions on the respondents' parts, from the drafting of
memorandum to the scheduling of meetings and the relaying of infor-
[VOL. 5:364
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mation by phone. The outcomes were varied. Two cases were settled
successfully in the sense that a discharge or treatment plan was finally
worked out that made medical or economic sense for the hospital
and/or was accepted by the family. Another intervention was a failure
in the sense that the patient was discharged at his own insistence, but
without adequate medical treatment according to the hospital treat-
ment team. One case had mixed results. The physician respondent
reluctantly consented to administer palliative chemotherapy to an ac-
tive drug abuser who lacked family support, but used the case to raise
the medical staff's awareness of the need for close consultation with
the oncology service before making such a referral.
The Adamant Duo. The disputing parties were a 30-year-old
quadriplegic male shooting victim and his mother versus the hospital
Social Work Department which is responsible for discharge planning.
The Social Work Department wanted to send the patient to another
facility for long term care and rehabilitation. The patient and his
mother were strenuously opposed to this plan. The mother was plan-
ning to move to another state but had no means to care for her son
and he was refusing to sign a release which would discharge him to
any other facility in the state.
Over a period of several weeks, our informant, a member of the
hospital's legal department, served as consultant to the social worker
in charge of the case. In this capacity he helped her think through the
practicality and legality of various alternative treatment plans (e.g.,
whether to seek to have the courts appoint the hospital as legal guard-
ian) and consulted on her behalf with other relevant sources of infor-
mation (e.g., the hospital's Risk Management Department on the
advisability of transporting the patient to a distant state). The case was
resolved successfully with the enactment of a plan to transport the
patient by plane to a rehabilitation facility in the state to which the
mother was moving.
C. Interpersonal Conflicts (5)
These were personal conflicts involving misunderstandings and
the use of poor interpersonal skills. Four of the five conflicts in this
category involved physicians embroiled either with patients or with
clerical or nursing staff. The fifth case was between two nurses.
The respondents functioned as mediators, typically using highly
directive tactics, after concluding that one of the parties was being
difficult or unreasonable. In two instances, the parties' stopped fight-
ing and ended on a note of better understanding; in the three other
cases the immediate conflict stopped, but no genuine rapprochement
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seems to have occurred. Although the respondents functioned as
mediators, unlike the mediators in end of life conflicts, they inter-
vened not because they defined mediating as a primary part of their
role, but because the conflict was interfering with patient care or de-
partment morale and they felt administratively compelled to
intervene.
Power Trip in the ER. The conflict was between two nurses who
were friends but had had a falling out over time-off schedules. The
older of the two was demanding that her colleague give her some of
her allotted time-off on the grounds that she deserved it more. Our
respondent was a nurse manager in the ER and the younger nurse
sought her help, complaining of unrelenting "harassment" from the
senior nurse about the time-off issue.
The respondent attempted to mediate a resolution, first by speak-
ing to each party separately, then through a few joint meetings. She
also tried coaching the younger nurse to be more assertive and devel-
oped a clear impression that the older nurse was being coercive.
When her efforts at bringing the parties together failed, she used her
power to make clear to the older nurse that she was behaving inappro-
priately and would have to stop her aggressive tactics. She told both
parties that she would have one of them transferred to another de-
partment if the conflict between them did not stop. The fighting did
stop, but the respondent noted ruefully that the nurses were no
longer friends.
The Demeaning Doctor. The disputing parties were an authorita-
rian female doctor and a very angry nurse who worked on the same
unit. The physician had a reputation for treating subordinates in a
disrespectful and coercive manner. The nurse objected to how she
was being treated by the doctor and complained to our respondent
who had managerial authority over the unit in question.
The respondent functioned as a not so neutral mediator who
brought pressure to bear on the physician to desist from her more
coercive behaviors and on both parties to work out a plan of mutual
accommodation. This was accomplished in a series of meetings, in-
cluding sessions with each of the participants and separate meetings
with the hospital Medical Director and the physician's department
chairperson. These sessions culminated in a meeting, chaired by the
respondent, involving the parties and the two high level physicians.
The doctor and the nurse were instructed to clear the air by telling
each other of their respective complaints and to work out a plan of
professional co-existence. This objective was attained. The physician
372 [VOL. 5:364
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agreed to be more respectful and the parties were able to work to-
gether more constructively.
D. Organizational Conflicts (5)
These were conflicts resulting from organizational mandates or
needs or competition with other health care institutions. All of them
were fueled by a scarcity of resources of one kind or another. Two of
the cases were among the longest conflicts described, extending over
many months.
Our informants played contrasting roles and experienced con-
trasting results. Two were advocates, either of their department or the
interests of the hospital against those of another institution. Both of
them achieved their primary objectives - e.g., a physician department
chief was able to leverage the considerable financial resources his unit
brings to the hospital to get the medical director of another service to
provide him with the surgical personnel he was seeking to improve
the performance of his unit.
The other three respondents served as third party intermediaries
in an organizational conflict but in ways that were not purely media-
tional in the traditional sense. Thus, one was a nurse administrator
intent on insuring that staffing needs and procedures were being ob-
served; another was an administrator charged with enacting directives
from above her to merge two groups of nurses; the third was a semi-
volunteer, drafted into "facilitating" a multi-department task force
charged with addressing a hospital wide problem. Those who played
the third party role in organizational cases reported some success in
dealing with the focal problem, but all of them expressed an aware-
ness that the underlying source of the conflict remained very much
unresolved.
The Merger of the ER Nurses. The hospital administration had de-
cided on a merger of the psychiatric and general medical nurses in
the emergency room, who, until then, had worked separately and did
not cross-cover each other. There was much resistance to this plan
from the two groups of nurses and there were strong personal animos-
ities between the two groups. ("It was like the Hatfields and the Mc-
Coys," according to 6ur respondent).
As a manager in the ER, the respondent was assigned the task of
effectuating the merger. She first met separately with each group of
nurses to inform them of the coming change and to get their buy-in.
In the meeting with the psychiatric nurses nobody would look at her.
She acknowledged their dislike of the plan and said that the merger
would be tried for six weeks, at the end of which time she would ask
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them for suggestions for improvement. She also developed a struc-
tured "education" plan, covering the psychiatric and general medical
competencies the nurses would need to know.
Throughout the several month transition period the respondent
remained highly directive, but willing to listen to complaints. The
merger was effectuated and, according to the respondent, the ten-
sions between the two groups of nurses was greatly reduced. However,
the majority of the psychiatric nurses eventually transferred out of the
ER or left the hospital altogether.
The Missing Medical Supplies. A common hospital problem is that
a variety of medical supplies are frequently not available when they
are needed (e.g., oxygen canisters). The respondent was asked by a
hospital executive to serve as the team leader of a task force to address
the problem. He was asked to do this because he had facilitation expe-
rience and was known to enjoy organizational problem-solving.
The respondent convened a task force of the most directly con-
cerned departments, none of which had wanted to assume responsi-
bility for tracking the supplies in question and being accountable for
their availability. He then organized a year long problem-solving pro-
cess with this group involving distinctive stages of fact-gathering, plan-
ning, piloting, and evaluation. There was also outreach to other
groups in the hospital to explain the pilot program and get feedback
on its feasibility.
The task force eventually formulated a pilot procedure for track-
ing the most important supplies and one of the task force depart-
ments agreed to accept responsibility for that task. The pilot was
successful in significantly reducing the incidents of missing supplies.
However, the process "fell apart" because key people on the task force
left the hospital and one of the task force departments became im-
mersed in internal problems of its own. At the time of our interview
the task force had been reconstituted and was beginning to imple-
ment and evaluate its plan again.
IV. SOURCES OF CONFLICT
As the institution's unofficial conflict managers, our respondents
are particularly well-positioned to provide insight into the causes of
destructive conflict within the hospital. To be sure, their perspective
does not encompass the entire landscape of health care conflict. They
are best thought of as direct observers of "ground zero" - the terrain
upon which large social and economic forces impact the daily transac-
tions of medical care in a particular type of health care organization.
374 [VOL. 5:364
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From their unique vantage point, our informants identified four
major sources of destructive conflict within the hospital: (1) Aspects of
health care culture, practice, or training; (2) organizational dynamics
within the hospital; (3) resource scarcity; and (4) characteristics of
patients and families associated with the particular problems of an in-
ner city environment. It is also important to note that for many of the
respondents, "conflict" referred to suboptimal medical intervention
or decision-making (e.g., failing to provide emotional support to a
grieving family) as well as to outright danger or hostility.
A. Health Care Culture, Practice, or Training
The most frequently mentioned source of conflict within the hos-
pital, alluded to by approximately 70% of the respondents, was some
aspect of "health care culture," broadly defined. Problematic physi-
cian characteristics were most often elaborated on, along with certain
aspects of medical practice. Other important sources of conflict in-
cluded aspects of nursing culture, the problematic climates of certain
medical services, particularly the emergency room and the trauma ser-
vices, and "value" differences arising either within the hospital or be-
tween the hospital and other health care institutions.
1. The Physician and Aspects of Medical Practice
Physician Power. The physician is a primary source of authority
and influence in the hospital. From our informants' perspective, this
power, while necessary and legitimate, can corrupt. Because they have
so much power, physicians often try to impose their wishes on staff
members or families, sometimes in ways that not only create tensions
but also compromise patient care. For example, even the clearly ex-
pressed wishes of patients or families for a dignified death can be frus-
trated by physicians who insist on remaining in control. Said one
physician: "Sometimes I think that docs become docs just so they can
be substitute gods. The white coat is both a cloak of honor and a
protection. In very interesting ways it protects you against having to
confront some of the humanity you otherwise would."
Paradoxically, relinquishing control can be difficult because of
the strong attachments the physician has formed with the dying pa-
tient. The same respondent commented:
The better a physician is, the more intensely they value the
doctor-patient relationship. One of my first cases as a medi-
cal student was a fellow almost exactly my age who had a ma-
lignant melanoma with metastasis everywhere and in the
most horrible pain. His brain had herniated one afternoon
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from one of his brain metastasis, and that paralyzed one side
of his body. But, he could still talk. I resuscitated him from
that. He woke up and I was talking to him and holding his
hand and he said, "Doc, you've got to let me go." His wife,
who was a wonderful lady, said, "You are holding him too
hard. You're hurting his hand. He has metastasis there."
That's not what the patient was saying. He was saying, "It's
too much. All that is left is pain. Let me die of my disease."
And the next time when he herniated, he did die. I had
done him a disservice by bringing him back when I did.
At other times, medical power is a liability because there is a dis-
junction between the official authority of the physician and his or her
actual knowledge. Thus, nurses often know more about case manage-
ment than the medical residents who are in charge. In addition to
being less knowledgeable than the nurses, residents often lack skill at
collaborating. A respondent with more than 20 years of nursing expe-
rience put it this way:
I think they are taught that they make the decisions for the
patient. When they write orders its going to be done. But
they're not taught to collaborate with the health care team.
They're taught that they are an entity in and of themselves
... . Residents start that behavior very early in their resi-
dency. You'll see it in their first year when they are just new
babes out of the womb and they don't have all the expertise.
I used to have fun seeing them tell me these things and I
used to say: "Do you really want to give that medication?"
And they'd say, "Yes, what did I write?" I'd say, "Well, this is
what you wrote and according to what you wrote, if you gave
that to this kid, this is what would happen." He'd say,
'You're a smart aleck." I'd say, "No, I tried to work with you
but you didn't want me to ask questions. That's my job - to
make sure that you are writing the right thing." But they
don't want you to ask questions for clarification because they
"know it" and they're first year residents and they "know."9
9. See Lees & Ellis, supra note 2, at 955-57. In a study of the stresses reported by exper-
ienced British nurses (n=20), "conflict with doctors emerged as a large problem, men-
tioned by 40 percent of the sample, and accounting for the second most commonly
mentioned stressor for trained staff." Elander & Hermeren supra note 2, at 151-53. The
authors queried 17 British nurses working in intensive care settings about "their principal
and most awkward ethical dilemma" Although the authors report their results impression-
istically, of the 19 examples they provide of nurses' "ethical dilemmas," 11 involved physi-
cians. The preponderance of these involved the unwillingness of doctors to admit a patient
was dying while insisting on more aggressive treatments. See also Chacko & Wong, supra
note 2, at 785-87. In surveying 361 nurse practitioners about their "role disagreements"
with physicians, the authors found that nurse practitioners working in hospitals reported
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A significant source of doctors' power is economic. Among the
most powerful in this regard are surgeons. A nurse administrator
commented:
Physicians tend to be very temperamental and surgeons even
more so. With a surgeon, they get upset with you and they
walk out. That affects you tremendously in your pocket
book. If they don't show up you've got patients, you've got
staff, you've got ORs, that are not used and patients that are
not serviced. That costs you money and time - a lot of
money.
To complicate matters further, the economic self-interest of doc-
tors is often opposed to the economic interests of the hospital. An-
other nurse administrator with years of ambulatory care experience
observed:
The physician is the entity that generates revenue. As a con-
sequence there is a mind set, whether deliberately taught or
learned in medical training, that pits everybody against
them. For instance, a physician wants to see a patient who
hasn't had the pre-registration and clearance that would al-
low us to identify the payor source. Theyjust say, "Bring the
patient in the room. Forget registration." But, in order for
the hospital to collect its piece of that fee, information has to
be in place for the visit, because if the visit is not docu-
mented, then there's no fee for the hospital. Somebody is
significantly more role conflict than nurses working in public health or doctors' offices.
The higher the number of physicians in the hospital the higher the reported role conflict.
See also Seago, supra note 5, at 44. Providing evidence that doctors are a significant source
of conflict for nurses, a survey of 115 nurse administrators' views on the characteristics of
"troubled" hospital units reports that "doctors with poor attitudes" was a relatively infre-
quent response, 18th most frequently cited on a list of 25 items. Nonetheless, 32 percent
of the respondents made this choice. There is also considerable evidence from studies of
physician-patient interaction that physician "communication" behaviors can have impor-
tant positive effects. See also Sandra K. Joos & David H. Hickman, How Health Professionals
Influence Health Behavior: Patient-Provider Interaction and Health Care Outcomes, in HEALTH
BEHAVIOR AND HrATH EDUCATION 216, 228, 234 (1990). The authors summarized the
results of 41 observational studies thusly: "[T]here is a positive effect on patient care out-
comes when the provider establishes rapport, encourages patients to express their con-
cerns and points of view, and provides information. Good interpersonal skills facilitate
these tasks and are related to improved patient satisfaction and compliance and outcomes
of care." In six experimental studies, comparing physicians who had received some form
of training in patient communication with a control group of doctors with no such train-
ing, all but one found a measurable impact on patient care. Of these investigations, the
authors observed that, ". . . only three of the six interventions specifically included inter-
personal skills training. However, the content of all the interventions incorporated infor-
mation-giving skills, and all promoted conflict resolution by encouraging the physician to
elicit the patient's perspective." Id.
JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY
responsible for seeing the individual's insurance card, mak-
ing sure that they validate the address and phone number,
keying in the information. This might take 15 or 20 minutes.
[For the physician] that is wasted time. They want the pa-
tient in the room so they can see them and get on to the next
patient. It's a process conflict.
The excesses of physician power are not entirely of their own
making. Several nurse managers noted that much depends on the
communication strategies of other hospital personnel. Two strategies
that work are empathy and responsiveness.1"
A physician came in and pounded on the desk screaming
that he wants a nurse fired. I usually have the "wave" on [a
soothing visual display] and some music, and I start asking
some questions: "What happened today? Were you on call
last night?" "Yes, I was and I had a really bad night. They
brought in a child and he died." You kind of get to the real
issue and they're just letting off steam because the nurse
didn't give a med or gave it late or didn't answer them
appropriately.
If the person who is trying to get the physician to see a differ-
ing point of view is able to engage them in a dialogue, have
them hear them, it will work... "boom, boom, boom." The
"boom, boom, boom" means, 'just give me the facts and
make it happen." That's it. That's all they want. They want
things to happen.
Aspects of medical practice. Respondents spoke of a number of char-
acteristics of medical practice which contributed to dysfunctional con-
flict. The fear of malpractice litigation is one such factor. In The
Unwilling Daughter, the respondent commented: "I had a sense they
[the physicians] were doing all this stuff for the daughter at the bed-
side, which happens all the time. You get a family who asks questions
or raises things which makes the physicians very defensive [because of
fear of being sued] ."
The culture of medicine also favors active intervention. This can
cause conflict if everyone does not agree that active treatment is the
proper response. An oncologist commented:
10. There are a variety of structural mechanisms which serve as a check on the power
of physicians such as the hospital bioethics committee and the related legal statutes which
empower families and patients when faced with a doctor who opposes their clear wishes.
We discuss the positive role of such mechanisms later.
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Just the other day in Tumor Board we talked about a patient
with advanced laryngeal cancer. We were talking about dif-
ferent treatment modalities. I raised the issue again: We
can't just give treatment in a vacuum. In cancer, when we
are trying to cure people, then I would definitely consider
taking somebody home with me, almost, if it means that they
could be cured of cancer. We would pull out all the stops.
But palliation, which is much of what we do here, that's a
whole other ball game. It's not clear to me that we have to
do everything all the time when we palliate people. A lot of
palliation is about doing less, not doing more. But its hard
for doctors. People want to do things all the time. You al-
ways have to do something - not doing is a sign of weakness
or ignorance. It's been a problem in the medical profession
for a long time.
The fragmentation of care can also cause difficulty. Particularly
at a teaching hospital, with its plethora of specialists and research and
educational obligations, effective communication may be thwarted be-
cause each person has only bits and pieces of the medical puzzle.
These difficulties played a role in several of the cases described to us,
particularly those involving treatment planning.
The problems introduced by the fragmentation of care can be
exacerbated by the very different treatment vantage points of the in-
volved health care specialists. This was the main theme in a case we
have labeled A Clash of Medical Perspectives. The respondent oncologist
described the conflict created between herself and the referring radi-
ologist about the treatment of a drug addict.
They [radiology] weren't seeing things through my eyes.
They were just seeing it though their eyes. I wasn't involved
at all in the decision-making. I was unhappy about that. I
just told [the referring radiologist], "I have bad news for you.
I am sorry but I don't want to treat Susie Jones. I just don't
see how I can do it. She's actively withdrawing now. She
needs drugs and I'm supposed to give this woman chemo,
and then what? She's going home to what? Have you
thought this through?"
Later in the interview she amplified:
Radiation oncologists don't admit people to the hospital.
When people get sick they are kind of stuck. They have to
rely on internists or medical oncologists to help them out.
Sometimes its okay, but other times I feel like we get called
in a little late in the game. We should have been apprised
sooner that there were problems developing, rather than get-
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ting a Friday afternoon surprise.... We're in it for the long
haul, so we're worried about what's going to happen. How
they are going to die? Who's going to be there? Much more
so than the radiologists are.
Differing vantage points may also create tension between nurses
and doctors in end of life situations. A physician noted that nurses
are often much closer to patients and their families than the treating
doctor. In such instances nurses may feel inclined to "go behind the
back" of the physician to make the families' wishes known. According
to our informant, this does nothing good for nurse/doctor
relationships. 11
2. Problems in the Culture of Nursing
It is not only physicians whose behavior or attitudes can be prob-
lematic. Nearly half of our respondents were nurses or nurse manag-
ers and several of them discussed characteristics of nursing subculture
which promote conflict. For example, in The Gang in the SICU, the
trauma nurse respondent observed:
Many nurses don't like visitors at all and would be happy if
none of us had extended families, because they don't want
anyone watching their routine, commenting on their routine
or giving feedback on their routine. We've had a lot of issues
in our ICU with going from strict, limited visitation to open
24 hour a day visitation. Huge conflict.
In the case in question, the nurses' dislike of "outsiders" was associ-
ated with a corresponding desire to use coercive measures to forcibly
extricate the gang members from the hospital - a strategy our respon-
dent was convinced would have made things much worse.
Another respondent felt that nurses are often poor at giving com-
mands in an effective way and that this is frequently at the root of
11. Given the central role attributed to doctors in creating dysfunctional conflict, it is
of interest that very few of our nominees for "conflict expert" were, in fact, physicians.
This piece of information may simply confirm the finding. On the other hand, more inter-
esting forces may be at work. When one of our respondents was asked to nominate other
potential interviewees, she named no MDs. The interviewer told her that nobody else had
either, and she was asked what she made of that. She responded that while she can think
of "many" MDs who are very good at handling conflict, they may not be mentioned be-
cause "I think we try to protect their time." She then cited as an example, a physician who
is "very good" at managing conflict but who is also "very busy." As it turned out, the physi-
cian in question was eager to be interviewed and gave one of the longest interviews in the
study. This incident raises the possibility that one of the barriers to improved conflict
management in health care may be the protective attitudes of others towards the very peo-
ple who are most at the center of the conflicts and have the most power to influence them.
[VOL. 5:364
2002] MANAGING CONFLICT IN AN URBAN HEALTH CARE SETTING 381
much of the conflict she sees in the hospital. "I have nurses that don't
know how to delegate. So they ask somebody, 'could you please do
this?' So the person has the opportunity to say 'no.' Okay, here's how
you should have done that - and it needs to be timely. It needs to be
live and real."
Perhaps the biggest source of difficulty is the nursing shortage. 12
Nursing used to be a primary career choice for women; it is no longer.
Even within the nursing profession there are alternatives to hospital
work, with its physically and emotionally demanding contact with pa-
tients. Nurses can now find less stressful work in clinics, managed care
settings, and what one informant referred to as "doc in the box" oper-
ations. The results: fewer hospital-based, nurses, older nurses (the av-
erage age of nurses has gone from 20 to 44), and much more conflict
between nurses and hospital management.
Many of these conflicts are about staffing."3 For example, at
many hospitals, where 60%-70% of admissions come from the emer-
gency room, unit nurses want more staffing because patient care
needs can escalate rapidly and unpredictably (what one respondent
referred to as the "what if' phenomenon). Unfortunately, hospital
administrators cannot satisfy such demands easily, even if funds to pay
for such staffing were available. A nursing executive explained it this
way:
Years ago I could have called up an agency. Let's say we
needed three nurses [on a unit] instead of two. The agency
would have sent in a nurse, sometimes within hours. There
are no agency nurses anymore. We put out orders for maybe
100 agency nurses a week and may get five. They aren't
there.
One approach to managing the staffing dilemma is the invoca-
tion by management of objective guidelines and regulations. There is
no shortage of these in an industry which has become highly regu-
lated. A nurse manager described the situation:
At our hospital, which is no different from any other hospi-
tal, we have manuals which have staffing plans. They are reg-
ulated by the Joint Commission. You need a plan for how
you are going to staff and care for patients. So, if you looked
in one of those books, you would actually see that this pa-
12. Cheryl A. Peterson, Nursing Shortage: Not a Simple Problem - No Easy Answers, 6 ONLINE
J. OF ISSUES IN NURSING, at 1-3 (January 31, 2001), at http://www.nursingworld.org/ojin/
topic14/tpcl4_1.htm.
13. Lees & Ellis, supra note 2, at 951. Understaffing was the single most frequently
cited source of stress by experienced nurses in a survey of 53 British nurses. Id.
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tient care unit should have no less than x amount of nurses.
It goes literally unit by unit. We know how many patients are
on the floor and the level of care they require. An ICU is
very different than a step-down unit, which is very different
than a general medical unit. It is in black and white in a pol-
icy for everyone to see. It falls within the regulations of the
Department of Health. When you benchmark, it falls within
the parameters of what I would say is common practice. The
nurse manager utilizes the guidelines as a tool in regards to
scheduling.
But the invocation of "rules" can sometimes escalate the tension
and create mistrust between nursing staff and hospital administra-
tors,1 4 as our respondent hastened to point out. Thus, nurses often
get angry when their intuition tells them they need more staff, but
management tells them the regulations say "no."
'You say we only need two nurses, and yes, you've got objec-
tive guidelines. I don't trust your guidelines, even though
they may be national guidelines. My gut tells me we should
have three nurses. My nursing experience tells me I won't
feel good about the care I provide." So management isn't
trustful that nurses will support their efforts of trying to im-
prove efficiency and effectiveness, for the whole purpose of
providing the right care to the right patients at the right
time, as well as sustaining the financial viability of the institu-
tion so everyone will end up having a job.
There is more to the conflict than this. Even though an aging
work force gets tired more quickly, nurses, paradoxically, also want to
work longer hours. Unfortunately, management is driven by account-
ability standards and research that tells them that shorter work shifts
are preferable. Our respondent described the situation plaintively:
Nursing is physical labor. Nurses are getting older. So what
any of us used to be able to do in 8 hours and 12 hours they
can't; they get tired. And nurses like to work 12 hours be-
cause then they get four days off. Sometimes we're our own
worst enemies. And they're pushing more for 12 hours;
which all the literature says that with an aging work force we
should be flexing down to 8 hours or 6 hours or 4 hours.
14. See id. at 952. The authors report that trained staff constituted 25 percent of the 53
subjects who believed that the worst source of stress arose from a perceived lack of support
from higher nursing management. Moreover, "[f]rom the trained [nursing] staffs point
of view, the majority of inter-nurse conflict arose from conflict with nursing officers, feeling
them to be far removed from the difficulties of managing a ward with inadequate equip-
ment and staff." Id. at 956.
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There is a disconnect .... We're constantly being asked to
go to 12 hour shifts and get more nurses. All the answers
aren't in synch with theory and research on practice. How to
align them so we can at least talk from the same page?
There is also a movement in organized nursing to eliminate
mandatory overtime. The nursing shortage gives nurses more clout to
make the demand a reality. But it further exacerbates the tension be-
tween nurses and hospital management, as well as taking its toll on
morale, as an older nursing culture gives way to changing norms
about work:
There's much lobbying right now within the state to elimi-
nate mandatory overtime. I would never even have thought
of bringing that subject up. When I was trained, it was "aban-
donment" if you left. You would lose your license. The work
ethic was ingrained in me. I would have never thought of
that. But decades roll on, there are ideas to look at things
differently. We very rarely use mandatory overtime here, but
let'sjust say that there wasn't a nurse. What do you do? How
do you manage? Or let's say there are three nurses and one
was to go home at 7 PM and you need the three? These are
the conflicts in health care that you are dealing with. It's like
a death in some instances.
3. Departmental "Cultures"
Nearly one third of the respondents commented on how aspects
of the "culture" or ethos of a medical service unit could have a nega-
tive impact on its ability to deal effectively with conflict or even recog-
nize that destructive conflicts are occurring. The Emergency and
Trauma Departments were singled out in both regards.' 5
The Emergency Department. Two nurse managers with long experi-
ence in emergency medicine noted that the emergency room is "a
world unto itself." This uniqueness is the result of never knowing the
number and nature of the patients who will suddenly require treat-
ment, particularly at a busy inner city hospital. The emergency room,
according to our respondents, is also something of a "dumping
ground" - the place where other medical institutions send patients
with which they don't know what to do.
15. See generally id. at 947 (explaining that emergency rooms and intensive care units
are frequently reported to be the most stressful work environments for nurses because of
their unpredictable workloads, use of hi-tech equipment, high levels of environmental
stimuli, such as heat and noise, continual possibilities of crisis, and frequent need for as-
sessment and monitoring).
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These medical realities foster a culture of great internal cohesion
and self-confidence. One of the nurses remarked, "Its sort of like
we're separate. We're on our own. We take care of everything we
need to take care of." She went on to note that the unfortunate down-
side to such zeal is the inclination to deny or minimize the levels of
conflict which are actually occurring.
The Trauma Department. Three respondents, all physicians, ex-
pressed the view that trauma units may also be less adept at handling
conflict well because of the same inflated sense of power and infallibil-
ity, amplified perhaps by the appeal of the trauma unit environment
for what one of them called the "surgical personality - brash and bold:
maybe wrong, but never in doubt." Another physician described how
this machismo culture sometimes plays itself out in the treatment of
the poor and minority group patients:
Its okay to be a little more "cowboy" with "these" patients.
The tendency toward that attitude exists in some services
more than others. I would single out the trauma service
here, not because they are a bad service, but because it's al-
most inevitable for "fire dogs" and "cowboys" to be fire dogs
and cowboys. What makes the trauma service good is that
they ride roughshod over everything. They charge into a sit-
uation with arms akimbo and devices flying. They take care
of whatever has to be taken care of and to hell with nice in-
teracting with human beings. You take care of medicine first
and then worry about human beings.... The classic thing -
"The patient was uncooperative so we had to paralyze and
intubate them to get an evaluation." There is some validity
to that because if somebody comes in sick and he might have
a life-threatening trauma, if you don't get the information
you need fast enough, somebody will die and most people
that come through here don't want to die. But it means that
if they are a little uncooperative, a little drunk, look a little
bit cross-wise at the docs, the docs will feel more justified in
saying, "The hell with you. We will simply make you unable
to object to care by putting you out."
4. The Lack of Needed Health Care Services
In terms of generating conflict, not all the problems come from
within the hospital. We have already noted this with regard to the
effects of the nation wide nursing shortage and we will return to the
theme when we examine our respondents' views on the conflicts pro-
voked by shrinking health care budgets. The absence of appropriate
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health care facilities was another external factor which has implica-
tions for the kinds of conflicts which break out within hospitals.
This was the driving theme in two disputes. In A Clash of Medical
Perspectives, described earlier, the problem was the absence of facilities
to which to send terminally ill cancer patients in need of chemother-
apy who lack family or other social support. As our oncologist respon-
dent put it:
Not everybody has a comfortable bed at home and somebody
to feed them and stroke them. It's just not like that here,
and you can't practice medicine in a vacuum. It's not like
you can say, "You have a drug problem. Why don't you come
to our drug rehab?" or "Let me get you a consult," or "Why
don't you take a little detour into this wing?" It's very weak
here. There's no place where you can say, 'You've just been
discharged from the hospital. You should go to this step-
down, half way house."
In The Patient Nobody Wanted, described to us by a hospital social
worker, the problem was similar. The patient in question was a 72
year old man with serious psychiatric as well as cardiac problems who
was admitted to the cardiac care unit but was refusing all medical
treatment. For eight days he remained in the CCU with no treatment.
Eventually, he was transferred to Psychiatry where he agreed to take
psychotropic medication but he continued to refuse all cardiac care.
He was eventually discharged from the hospital after a frustrating two
month tug of war between psychiatry and cardiology that also came to
involve the Consultation and Liaison Psychiatric Service, the Medical
Director's Office, the Assistant Director of Nursing, and the hospital's
Legal Department. Our respondent noted that the sub optimal care
rendered the patient was the result of the absence in the state of a
single unit to treat patients dually diagnosed with serious psychiatric
and medical conditions.
5. "Value" Conflicts
The culture of health care encompasses a variety of ethical, philo-
sophic, and pragmatic values. Three of our respondents mentioned
value related tensions as a source of conflict within the hospital.
These include such things as the conflict between cost containment
versus the rendering of the highest quality of medical care possible;
conflicts between those who want to treat versus those who want suf-
fering to end; and conflicts between the aims of research and those of
clinical care.
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The hospital also encounters value based conflicts with some of
the institutions with which it interacts. One respondent described a
conflict in which the hospital found itself in conflict with another hos-
pital involving the patient's right to know versus intellectual property
rights. In this dispute, researchers at the other institution, eager to
protect their research protocols, were insisting that a patient sign an
informed consent agreement lacking important medical details about
the treatment. The patient felt she had a right to this information.
Perhaps the most common inter-organizational conflict is with man-
aged care companies, whose economic interest often leads them to
pressure the hospital to agree to clauses in contracts that the hospi-
tal's Legal Department feels are not in the hospital's best interest.
B. Organizational Dynamics
More than half of the respondents (53%) mentioned some aspect
of organizational dynamics as a source of conflict within the hospital.
These dynamics seem characteristic of complex organizations in gen-
eral, although many of the details were unique to health care. From
the interviews, it is possible to identify three organizational variables
that appear to fuel conflict and complicate the task of effective con-
flict management: (1) Coordination problems (2) "political" tensions
within and between departments, and (3) ambivalent organizational
attitudes towards conflict management.
1. Coordination Problems
A hospital is a complex organization of highly specialized disci-
plines and services. Meshing the component parts is often a chal-
lenge. In part, the problem stems from the difficulty any one person
has of comprehending the language and knowledge of another spe-
cialty area, even one that he or she is supposed to manage. Said one
nurse manager: "Because this is such a large institution, no one per-
son can know everything. To give an example, my clinical back-
ground is in neuroscience. I'll tell you that when I go to the neonatal
ICU, I can't make clinical judgments because it is not my area of
expertise."
A more frequently mentioned difficulty was poor communication
across departments:
A department can develop a policy that's department wide
but really has a downstream effect for somebody else. But
nobody talked about it and you'll see something and say,
"But wait a minute!" So we need to do a lot more collabora-
tion.... Historically, we have been a "silo" kind of organiza-
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tion. We don't disseminate information among ourselves
very well. We have some excellent programs that we, as indi-
vidual employees don't really know about.
The hospital leadership is aware of these problems and has begun
developing mechanisms to address the issue. The establishment of
inter-disciplinary task forces is one such device. Another is the crea-
tion of new work roles. The respondent just quoted, for example, has
a new position whose responsibilities include studying inter-unit coor-
dination problems. Still another mechanism is the use of newsletters
and internet technology to increase hospital wide information
exchange.
Unfortunately, these mechanisms sometimes fall victim to the
very problems they are trying to address. The Case of the Missing Medi-
cal Supplies illustrates the dilemma. The first problem faced by the
multi-department task force being led by the respondent was design-
ing a "one size fits all" process for tracking the supplies. "It got to be a
problem, too, in finding a solution that was going to service all units
because they are all a little different - medical, surgical, pediatric
units. We had to make sure the solution we came up with would sat-
isfy everybody."
After months of effort the task force had identified a lack of ac-
countability as a significant contributor to the "disappearing" supplies
and had drafted a pilot program to address the problem. A number
of events intervened to frustrate the implementation of the pilot pro-
gram. There was attrition in some of the key departments involved so
that new individuals had to be educated about the pilot program; the
department that was to play a key accountability role in the pilot got a
new computerized scheduling system, which diverted a significant
amount of their energies and attention; and the Joint Hospital Com-
mission began a review of the hospital at large, which also drew atten-
tion and interest away from the program. At the time of the interview,
some 18 months or more from the start of its work, the task force was
once again gearing up to implement and evaluate its pilot plan.
It is in the operating rooms that the challenges of coordination in
the service of quality medical care are most acute. One respondent
described her role on a task force appointed to help deal with staff
and patient complaints about the running of the ORs.
The OR is a large, revenue-generating department, but it
also has a lot of issues. It is a multi-factorial, complex depart-
ment because we have all the services that use the operating
room: trauma surgeons, cardiovascular surgeons, open heart
surgeons, neurosurgeons, plus anesthesia. All of them have
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to learn to live together within the constraints of a 12 OR
suite setup. How do we do that better?
The problems of coordination in the OR are complicated by the
hospital's designation as the highest level trauma center that exists in
the state.
We are a trauma center. Traumas come in and they go first. I
don't care what's scheduled, unless it is open-heart. You can
have patients scheduled for an elective and your elective
cases get bumped because of emergencies. They [the sur-
geons] had concerns about the process in terms of how
timely things get done in the operating room: equipment,
staff ability to use the equipment, the lack of what they per-
ceived as staff readiness and willingness to work with them
and help them. The nursing staff and other staff felt that the
surgeons were being abrupt, non-communicative, not willing
to even listen to another person's or service's issues - the
so-called "God syndrome." "I'm the surgeon. whatever I say -
do it!" We've been working with the staff and physicians, the
chairmen of the departments and the individual physicians
on looking at the process.
2. "Political" Tensions
The difficulties of coordination frequently involve more than
overcoming hurdles of communication and focus. Departments often
have very different underlying agendas. These differences can create
intractable dilemmas. This was an important, if secondary theme, in
The Patient Who Nobody Wanted. In that instance, neither the psychiatry
or cardiac services wanted to treat the patient for fear he would die on
their watch and they would be held liable for providing inadequate
care.
The Missing Medical Supplies provides the best illustration of how
"political" differences can impede problem-solving and stir up divisive-
ness. Our respondent made it clear that much of his frustration in
attempting to orchestrate a good problem-solving process by the task
force he was nominally in charge of was the result of conflicts between
two departments, neither of whom wanted tracking the supplies to
become their job:
I get these two departments coming to me after meetings
and the two of them are saying, "its not my job; I don't want
to do it that way. .. ." Also when we were brain storming
there would be barbs directed at the other service or com-
ments about, "They call and ask us to bring equipment and
we shouldn't be doing that." Always the "we shouldn't have
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to be doing that" or "they should be doing that." There was a
lot of finger-pointing during the meetings.
Effectively managing the inter-department rivalry on the task
force was exacerbated by the strategy of the manager of one of the two
departments:
The head of this department was not on the team. She had
assigned a supervisor to the team and unfortunately, didn't
empower the supervisor to make a lot of decisions. When
the team would make a decision the supervisor felt it was ap-
propriate but it would come back to the manager and she
would say her staff wasn't going to do that or take that re-
sponsibility. It was a lot of time wasted.
3. Ambivalent Organizational Attitudes Toward Conflict
Management
Students of organizational behavior have noted the ambivalent
attitude which organizations often have about conflict.1 6 On the one
hand, "conflict" with other organizations is often seen as a good thing
and the source of much innovation and social progress. 7 On the
other hand, conflict within the organization is often viewed as a sign
of disloyalty, dysfunction and a threat to the attainment of important
organizational goals.1" These attitudes are rarely openly expressed,
but they are clearly implied in the lukewarm support organizational
leadership gives to the task of "managing" conflict within the
organization.
Thus, a number of respondents noted that the Office of Em-
ployee Assistance (EA), which they would like to use as a place to ef-
fectuate problem-solving and conflict resolution, is generally seen by
staff as a place they are being "sent to" to be disciplined for poor per-
formance. The result is that EA is almost never used to mediate inter-
personal conflict. Aside from various formal grievance mechanisms,
which appear to be familiar venues in this heavily unionized hospital,
there does not appear to be any clear place where managers or em-
ployees can go to resolve their differences in a non adversarial way.
An occasional respondent expressed a wish that such a forum existed
- and one even sought such assistance from outside the hospital for a
dispute between two subordinates that she felt unable to mediate
herself.
16. Kolb, supra note 6, at 99.
17. See id
18. See id.
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We do have - and I'm very familiar with them, I'm sorry to
say - labor relations and grievance hearings and arbitrations.
I was down at the EEOC [Equal Employment Opportunities
Commission] last week and the month before that, too. We
have an affirmative action office that reviews work place is-
sues for employees that are classified. So we do have some
formal processes. What we lack is a process for resolving
conflict on a peer to peer level.
INTERVIEWER: There's no mechanism to help mediate dis-
putes between individuals?
RESPONDENT: Not unless it goes through labor relations.
I think that is late. It is very late in the process and it takes a
long time. The one conflict that I described where we found
a mediator from the mental health services unit of the hospi-
tal was actually a conflict between one of our paramedics and
an ED nurse. The nurse complained to the nurse. manager
and the paramedic complained up through the grievance
system. They are both good, valuable people and they're in
different unions and we're in different unions. We could
fight it out, director to director, but that's not going to solve
the interpersonal problem down there. I'm proud of the
fact that I was able to find someone to mediate that.
Ambivalent organizational attitudes towards the management of
conflict were apparent in The Missing Medical Supplies. The respon-
dent made it clear that he had mixed feelings about taking on the job
of task force leader. He enjoys this kind of "organizational develop-
ment" work, but he felt that he tends to get "over committed" to it.
This sense of "over commitment" also appeared to be a reflection of
the limited support he felt he got from the hospital executive who had
asked him to take on the job. The executive had the authority to or-
der the managers of the affected departments to free up staff time to
give the task force the help it needed. This authority was never used.
There were other problems:
My understanding of what [the executive] should have done
was to outline the process as he saw it and give us more direc-
tion. I felt a lack of direction. It was like, "This issue came
up; you take care of it." It came out of the blue so I was
feeling a little dumped on. I felt the executive should have
provided more direction if the hospital really wanted this is-
sue worked on. Give me the background. Give me some in-
formation. It wasn't forthcoming. . . . I also invited the
executive to our first meeting so that he could outline the
expectation to the team. I felt we needed to hear it from the
top. If we are being pulled together to solve a problem, tell
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us the end product you are looking for. My feeling is, I still
don't have the answers to my questions.
The respondents' perceptions of the hospital's posture regarding
training in conflict management may be another sign of organiza-
tional ambivalence. Nearly all of our respondents thought it was "very
important" that health care professionals get training in handling con-
flict effectively, whether for the purpose of improving the quality of
patient care or to reduce the threat of law suits. However, only a few
informants reported getting such training. Although we were told by
one informant that the Human Resources Department offers such
help, another felt that since training in managing conflict is voluntary,
many people don't seek it out. In this vein, a nurse administrator
wryly observed:
Several years ago we went through this big "Great Expecta-
tions" customer service training program. All of us had to
have mandatory training - every department, every individ-
ual, every housekeeper, you name it. Not the physicians. Our
patient satisfaction tool was saying it was everybody else; not
the physicians. I started laughing.
INTERVIEWER: Would doctors come to a conflict training
workshop?
RESPONDENT: It would have to be a different name. I
think it would have to be called something different - some-
thing about "team building" or something else. But you sure
couldn't call it "conflict resolution," because they don't have
any!
Perhaps the most striking sign of organizational ambivalence to-
ward conflict is the popularity of conflict avoidance. According to
nearly two-thirds of the respondents this is the preferred strategy for
dealing with hospital conflict.' 9
19. In six studies of nurses' approaches to conflict management, avoidance and com-
promise have been identified as the most frequently used conflict management styles, as
opposed to the more robust collaborative and competitive approaches. See Patricia E.B.
Valentine, Management of Conflict: Do Nurses/Women Handle it Differently?, 22J. OF ADV. NuRs-
ING 142, 145 (1995). In a similar vein, a study employing an assertiveness inventory, re-
ports that 75 percent of the nurse respondents were characterized by "dysfunctional"
assertion repertoires (e.g., low assertion/hi anxiety). See Lees & Ellis, supra note 2, at 954.
Only 25 percent of the respondents fell into a more functional assertion category (low
anxiety/high assertion). The authors believe that the low level of assertiveness among
nurses in their study may help explain the degree to which conflict with physicians and
other nurses were experienced as such potent stressors by their respondents. Id at 959.
But see Patricia E. B. Valentine et al., Nurse Educators'/Administrators' Ways of Handling Con-
flict, 14J. OF PROF. NURSINc. 288, 295 (1998). The authors assert a more positive interpreta-
tion of the female nurses' preference for avoidance and compromise and their
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People do not like to handle conflict. If they can, they ig-
nore it. Conflict makes everyone uneasy. People hold onto
conflict. They are uncomfortable sitting down and discuss-
ing it. It amazes me. There is a way to do it that's not going
to harm anybody. When there's conflict it makes them
(medical staff) very nervous and many times they'll say: "Un-
til this family is all in the same place at the same time we're
not doing anything. . . ." When there is conflict that is their
approach. In most situations in health care when there is
conflict the doctor's come around when the family is not
there. They don't answer their pagers. They withdraw and
avoid.
The respondents expressed several ideas about the source of con-
flict avoidant inclinations in their colleagues. Two nurse managers
noted that many health care professionals have never been taught
how to deal with conflict. Conflict avoidance may also be a function
of the lack of visible procedures and venues for bringing the relevant
stakeholders together. We heard much about this, particularly in re-
gard to conflicts over treatment planning.
A nurse with advanced practice training in bereavement counsel-
ing expressed the view that some medical services at the hospital were
better at managing conflict than others. Oncology was good in this
respect, she felt, while "the culture" of the ICU was more problematic.
According to a doctor with much bioethical training, another potent
source of avoidance is the difficulty doctors have talking to patients
about death.
In a situation like this [end of life discussions] you're always
talking to a patient about their anticipated demise, and
that's something lots of doctors are intensely uncomfortable
talking about .... You have to look mortality in the face and
be as sure and confident as you can that the patient is look-
ing their mortality in the face with as great a degree of stead-
fastness and awareness as possible.
Helping colleagues manage their conflict avoidant inclinations is
an important role for many of our respondents. We will examine it
more closely when we turn to the central topic of intervention.
A Positive Note on The "Anatomy" of Organizational Responses to Con-
flict. The hospital response towards conflict does appear to have a
more positive side: One third of the respondents made reference to
units within the hospital which function as places to resolve conflicts
disinclination to use competitive stratagems. They argue that women's strategic prefer-
ences may be a reflection of a distinctly female ethos of nurturing and connectedness.
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and promote organizational learning, even though this is not their
official purpose. We have already noted that our oncologist respon-
dent used the Tumor Board to begin a dialogue with other medical
services to establish clearer criteria for dealing with the terminally ill
drug abuser.
The director of a medical department reported a similar strategy
to deal with his frustrations in getting several other departments to
provide better service to his unit:
We have a group that meets every other week. It includes
myself, my nurse coordinator, radiology, all of the peripheral
ancillary services in the institution. We deal with clinical and
nonclinical issues. For example, I got admitting to finally
show up consistently. Now we have someone who, after six
years of hammering, is beginning to make changes in some
of the admitting policies and procedures. This individual
has decided to take accountability on herself, God bless her.
A nurse administrator described her assignment to improve the
functioning of the operating rooms:
I spent weeks in the OR. I got into scrubs and actually sat
there watching each function, because the OR is a micro-
cosm all of its own. There's a board runner, if you can imag-
ine; there is one person assigned to look at the board and if
there are cases running over, they have to reassign rooms
and reallocate staff. That in itself is a job: With the calls
coming in and saying, "I need you to switch the order of my
cases. I need you to do this. A trauma's coming up from the
ED." That was something just to watch. Then I watched a
scheduler. Then I watched some cases and saw how people
interacted. I spent time with the OR staff, anesthesia; and
medical equipment. Just watched the operation . . . . My
assignment was not just for the expertise I brought for con-
flict. I was bringing another expertise too. I was doing that
to understand the operation of the OR and then to develop,
as a facilitator, some measures of process within that operat-
ing environment. I was to facilitate meetings, but I was also
to document when interventions were made and what the
outcomes of those interventions were, and then bring that
back so that we could develop a feedback loop.
Other places which were mentioned as vehicles for addressing or-
ganizational problems included the Bioethics Committee; the Medical
Prognosis Committee, the hospital's complaint hot line; the Profes-
sional Liability Committee; the Department of Social Work (which
does the brunt of the work in interfacing with families and other units
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in and outside of the hospital); and Human Resources, which does
organizational development and offers a variety of workshops (includ-
ing one on conflict management). To this list we may also add the
Administrators on Call and the Lawyers on Call, individuals who are
specifically charged with handling "emergencies" which arise, fre-
quently on weekends, when the normal administrative staff are un-
available.2" The effectiveness of these institutional mechanisms is, of
course, another matter. Their existence indicates that institutional
ambivalence towards conflict is very much a two-sided coin.
C. Resource Scarcity
The conflicts engendered by shrinking resources provoked some
of the most pungent and detailed remarks of any subject covered dur-
ing the interviews. Nearly one third of the respondents spoke directly
about the negative effects of reduced resources on conflict within the
hospital and between the hospital and other organizations. (All but
one of these respondents was a director of a hospital department).
Many other respondents made indirect allusions to negative economic
impacts.
The flavor of the change in hospital economic realities is cap-
tured by the rueful reflections of one department manager:
In the 80s, health care was in a big growth spurt. So we
could be creative and we didn't need to be productive and
we were well paid and we grew. It was a growth industry -
14% a year. It was nice. And now we are challenged with
managing health care like a business; managing people like a
business; managing our clients like clients. And the financial
restraints are phenomenal, especially for an industry that
had been such a growth industry. I have vice-presidents that
I am working with that say, "Why did you do this back then?"
Because we could! No one asked us to be financially ac-
countable. It was great in the 80s! Hospitals have operating
budgets and they have budgets of money that they reinvest in
capital and, of course, hospitals and health care people like
to buy lots of technology; we love to buy the newest toy. And
as an academic health center we should have the best equip-
ment - we take care of the sickest people. However, as the
budget shrinks, the work force shrinks. We've had numer-
ous layoffs. We're going to have another layoff in the next
couple of weeks. So we had a "work redesign." We've "re-
20. In our sample three respondents had served as Administrator on Call.
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engineered"; we've "down-sized"; we've "reduced force." I
mean, we've called it everything.
The shifting economic circumstances have fueled conflicts with insur-
ers, with patients and their families, with other hospital systems, and
most significantly, within the hospital, as various hospital stake holders
compete for shrinking resources.
1. Conflicts with insurers.
An obvious source of the economic constraints are the cutbacks
in insurance reimbursement with the advent of managed care. Inter-
estingly, relatively few of the respondents discussed this matter at any
length, perhaps because a relatively small percentage of the hospital's
patients have private insurance. One physician referred to the con-
flict between the hospital and insurers as "the chronic, nagging push
to drive patients out of the hospital." He recognized that there is a
genuine economic problem, but objected strenuously to the idea that
it should be the insurance companies that get to make the decision on
patient care. Another physician, commented with a wry laugh:
"There's no conflict resolution there that will work with the exception
of dynamite and letter bombs. These people don't want to pay or they
make you jump through such hoops to be paid."
2. Conflict with patients.
Two respondents noted that Medicare and Medicaid will not re-
imburse the hospital for rehabilitation of a patient past the period of
active medical care. The hospital is thus under pressure to discharge
the patient or get stuck with huge uncollectable medical bills. This
can cause conflict between the hospital and a patient who refuses to
be transferred or with a family which is unable or unwilling to cooper-
ate in discharge planning. Several of the cases discussed during the
interviews were of this type.
The changing system of insurance reimbursement can cause
more mundane conflicts with patients:
A patient will arrive at the hospital for an outpatient appoint-
ment not having brought their insurance card. We are try-
ing to verify the type of insurance. He does not understand
the process because the managed care company has not edu-
cated their consumer about their program. The patient is
thinking that we are just making them wait an inordinate
amount of time, so they go another route - to the adminis-
tration to make a complaint that they waited an hour, when,
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in fact, four or five things needed to happen prior to that
appointment.
Because so many of the hospital's patients are directly dependent
on public funds for their medical care, government health care initia-
tives have sometimes caused major headaches in patient-staff rela-
tions. A respondent with long experience in ambulatory care services
commented:
It is the way that managed care rolled out in our country. In
this state, specifically, they started with the AFDC (Aid for
Families with Dependent Children) population. That was
the Governor's plan for Medicaid. A lot of the mothers who
were receiving aid for their children were auto-assigned into
managed care. They had an arbitrary auto-enrollment. The
mothers didn't read the documents. They don't know that
you have to call your PCP. "What's a PCP?" 'Your primary
care provider." That terminology is new to them. Calling
someone before you go to the ER is a new concept. "I
missed my doctor's appointment; I'm going to the ER." We
have rules that say you have to treat them; establish a medical
screening. We have all of that, but they don't understand all
that. I think that with the socioeconomic class aspect, we ha-
ven't done a good job with our education as it relates to
changes in how health care should be accessed. Our pa-
tients, woefully, don't understand that.
3. Conflicts with other hospital systems over "desirable" patients.
The shrinking economic pie has led to conflicts between the in-
ner city hospital in which our respondents work and its sisters hospi-
tals in the local area. In some cases, conflicts arise with many other
hospitals in the state because of the hospital's status as a Level One
Trauma Center and as the provider of emergency ambulance services
for the region.
Sometimes the conflicts are directly over money. The hospital
must compete with other hospital systems for state controlled "charity
care" dollars, as well as for money from the city Health Department.
At other times conflicts arise over patients; some are economically de-
sirable because they have good insurance coverage while others are
much less desirable because they are poor and lack such coverage.
For example, most trauma cases are attributable to automobile
accidents and automobile insurance coverage is, in the words of one
physician, "the best health care coverage out there." It is a common
view of trauma centers that the community hospitals do their best to
retain such patients rather than transfer them to the trauma centers
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which are better equipped to render the appropriate medical care.
Our respondent believed that this dispute could be resolved if there
was accurate data on how many trauma patients were being inappro-
priately cared for at community hospitals, but he expressed skepticism
that getting the data would be easy. The state health department has
no funding to do the necessary research, so there is a great reluctance
on the part of hospitals to supply the information. Even if accurate
data could be obtained, it would then be necessary to assemble "politi-
cal allies" to pass a state regulation, conformity to which would then
need monitoring and enforcement.
Because the hospital's Emergency Medical Service is a state-wide
operation, the hospital often becomes entangled in the strategic bat-
tles which hospitals wage to insure a tolerable flow of the economi-
cally desirable patients. Much of this warfare over patients is
conducted in the shadow of state regulations. One respondent with a
great deal of experience with this struggle had much to say on the
subject.
The good news is that hospitals in the state cannot deny
emergency care to anyone based on their ability to pay, that's
the good news. However, hospitals can't continue to take
care of patients without reimbursement .... They could be
under-staffing their emergency departments because histori-
cally emergency departments lose money in an urban set-
ting. So you under-staff your emergency department and
this denies access to your inpatient beds .... [This strategy]
causes a tremendous amount of stress for patients in the in-
ner city, where EMS and emergency departments are their
safety net health care because they don't have access to pri-
mary care doctors.
The regulations that are intended to impose limitations on the
strategies hospitals employ for controlling patient flow can get quite
detailed. These details are helpful, according to our respondent, but
they by no means eliminate the strategic jockeying, or the stress this
imposes on EMS workers.
We have these things called "bypasses and diverts." In the
EMS and hospital industry there are articles and law suits
about this all the time. A hospital goes on bypass and they
announce to everybody, "We're bypassing because we don't
have the capacity or capability to take care of patients." And
they can divert certain kinds of beds. For example, we were
diverting women in labor under 32 weeks. Our neonate
nursery had been filled to capacity for the last 6 weeks ....
They put these diverts out and they broadcast them through
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the system and its just another piece of information EMS has
to manage.
What we find with the hospitals is that it's a domino effect.
One hospital calls a bypass and within hours the next hospi-
tal does; and there are certain times of day where you know
bypasses are being called and you think its due to economics
or deliberate staffing .... However, the 911 call volume is
consistent. So we have the work product coming in and the
responsibility to take them to hospitals and the hospital say-
ing, "We can't handle them." And they're not allowed to
deny care to people based on their chief complaint, and, in
fact, if 8 out of 10 hospitals are calling a bypass, we get into
what's called a rotation. It's a forced situation where the hos-
pital has to take the next patient that comes out of their geo-
graphical area .... They're not great rules, but they protect
the consumer. I believe in the rules; they're a whole lot bet-
ter than anarchy. But, I think we can do a whole lot better
job of taking care of patients.
4. Conflict within the hospital.
Economic retrenchment has perhaps had even greater effects on
conflict among various groups within the hospital than with the hospi-
tal's external competitors. The respondents described three major
types of conflicts within the hospital which are directly related to eco-
nomic constraints: conflict between and among departments, con-
flicts between departments and the central administration of the
hospital, and conflicts between an older, "slower" hospital ethos and a
newer ethos of efficiency and cost containment.
The inter-departmental rivalries caused by economic necessities
were well-captured by one department director:
In the shrinking pool, the competition is now between disci-
plines in the hospital. Nursing is looking for new beds; phy-
sicians are looking for new invasive monitors; the OR's
looking for new high-tech operating equipment. Now we're
all justifying it not just on the nice touchy-feely "we're going
to save lives and babies," but now we have to justify it [in
economic terms]: "Are we going to turn a profit on it?
How's it going to impact our new budget? Are you going to
be able to reduce another expense?" So you have to do all
this financial justification and even after you've done that
and you proved the value of it and you know you're going to
save small children and old people, there's shrinking dollars
and you might not get funded. There's a lot of frustration, a
lot of inbred competition. The neonate nursery needs isolet-
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tes but EMS needs ambulances. So now we have a decision-
maker that has to balance out what's more important, the
ambulances or the babies? These kinds of decisions are be-
ing made everywhere in health care every single day.
The conflict between the trauma service and admitting is another
example of interdepartmental conflict fueled in part by economics.
The Admissions Department lacks the sophisticated computer
software and hardware that would allow for the rapid and automatic
retrieving of Medicaid and other data from distant data banks. The
consequences are reflected in the frustration expressed by one
respondent:
I do trauma and surgical critical care. A seriously injured
patient comes in, certain things have to be done. It's at
times vexing to get the registration people to do their job in
a manner such that we can get something as stupid as a med-
ical record number and appropriate information .... To
have a Continental Airlines employee hurt at the airport
come in and be registered as self-pay with no insurance is a
bit of foolishness .... At times people fail to recognize that
the goal of this institution is to provide care to sick and hurt
and injured patients - not to perpetuate a hospital on the
corner!
Interdepartmental conflict is also exacerbated by the unpredict-
able and acute needs that abruptly arise in hospitals, and by what one
respondent described as the tendency in any large organization to
hoard, particularly during periods of resource scarcity.
It is an organizational problem in health care. People hoard
so that you have it. You don't trust the process, so you
hoard. If you went into closets around here you're going to
find hidden wheelchairs and oxygen tanks - you're going to
find stuff everywhere. It's the nature of big organizations -
failure to trust that the process is going to work when you
need. "When I have an emergency, I'm going to make sure
that I have my stash."
Since departmental purse strings are ultimately controlled by ad-
ministrators in the hospital, respondents occasionally expressed frus-
tration with the hospital "bureaucracy." The Director of a hospital
surgical center commented:
We put in a request to replace three computers that are over
five years old, one or two of which are broken. I get 17 signa-
tures; I sign it; the Medical Director of the hospital signs it.
It goes. This is chump change. You're talking about $5500.
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It comes back to me from the head of Hospital Management
Information Services saying, "They just got machines as part
of their Y2K upgrade." What has one thing got to do with
the other? So I just wrote back to the Medical Director,
"This is unacceptable." "I don't care what happens. I'm not
stealing the money."
As far as I am concerned, all those budgets are fanciful.
They told me at one point that we overran our budget. The
budget of this Center is somewhere between $400,000 -
$500,000, of which 82% or more is fixed salaries. And $50-
$70,000 worth of junk - phones, beepers . . . . You don't
want me to pay for beepers? Fine, put it on someone else's
budget. Phones? All right, we don't need any phones. Of
the $70,000 of junk, $20-$25,000 is related to the Center's
network, our computer network, that we need for the
Center. You don't want us to have it, we won't be a [major]
Center. Just let me know. The amount of effort I need to
spend on this activity and the fact that I have not one admin-
istrator that oversees the Center is the source of my angina
and frustration. To me, that's conflict without resolution.
Another respondent also complained about administrative deci-
sion-making, but for a very different reason:
In the old days the process was very defined and clear. And
people like me, who were assertive, could go in and influ-
ence the key decision-makers. In fact, I had a videotape that
I played for these executives. I walked into their office and
played this tape and said, "Look, we could do this here." It
was a dispatcher telling a mother how to clear the air way of
her infant. The next day I had the mom bring the baby into
the hospital and we gave her an award. I can't tell you what
kind of funding I got after that! It was so easy. And I was
pretty good at it, bringing the mother and the baby and win-
ning over people's emotions. And there are physicians that
do similar. I mean, I learned that skill here; I didn't learn
that in school. I learned that from very influential people.
But now the process is not so well-defined. I don't even
know exactly who all the key decision-makers are. And even
if I did target the right person, I know they're limited in their
ability to fund things because the budget has shrunk so.
The complaints are not all directed upward; management has its
own frustrations with getting staff to accept the new economic reali-
ties. A nursing executive noted that the hospital had a $60 million
deficit last year. To eliminate the deficit, twelve work groups were
formed to reduce costs and improve quality. These efforts succeeded
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in eliminating the budget deficit, but they encountered a good deal of
resistance from employees.
People don't react to change well, or to how change is man-
aged. With the number of change efforts it is difficult to
maintain an optimal sustaining of whatever change was sup-
posed to take place .... There are many individuals who
don't feel they need to change; don't want to change, so in-
herent in that is a conflict .... People are getting tired by
trying to keep up the pace, but also anxious, in the sense that
its not going back to what they were used to, which is also
causing some conflicts. What they knew as learned behavior
before - "accept change but go back to what you were doing
before; its only going to be for awhile" - is not necessarily
happening this time.
The economic constraints have also provoked within the hospital
a conflict of a more general kind: The clash of an older, well estab-
lished ethos of paternalism with a more recent business ethos that em-
phasizes efficiency and cost containment. These two "cultures"
maintain an uneasy co-existence within the hospital, but the tensions
between them have grown sharply with economic retrenchment. The
tensions were evident in the remarks of several respondents.
The physician head of a major department:
There was a great conflict in the early and mid 197 0s when
this hospital was erected. There were great concessions
made to the community, from employment to a lot of other.
things. There were many unions. It has taken 25 years to
slowly move this institution out of an inner city, charity hos-
pital mentality into one where health care has fortunately
morphed itself into a business .... It has taken a generation
to slowly move this institution forward. It's not that we ha-
ven't made progress; in places, we have made great progress.
But bureaucracies are very good at self-perpetuation. The
only thing that preexists bureaucratic survival mechanisms
are the cockroaches .... I remember reading in Time or
Newsweek that at General Motors there was something like 13
or 17 layers between the guy who put the ribbon into your
car and the CEO. At Toyota there were five. We're General
Motors.
He went on to note how gratifying it was to find an administrator
who has been responsive to his needs. "She doesn't get defensive and
she agrees that there is an issue and is trying to remediate it among
her people. Not easy, because of the bureaucratic and inner city cul-
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ture in this institution. If this was a private institution it would be
easier to fire people."
A nurse manager spoke in similar tones:
Things have happened over the past several years that have
driven change; one of them is financial. It has forced action
and the way the institution has to operate isn't the same as it
had been historically. The culture before was more slow, in
the sense that it allowed time; it allowed other ways to com-
pensate. And those luxuries aren't necessarily in place, so its
causing friction. I'll give you an example of the nursing staff.
If, when you benchmark - because we are doing a lot of
benchmarking - if other institutions can manage the same
number of patients, the same level of acuity of patients with
four nurses, we shouldn't be using six nurses. Previously we
may not have focused the effort on looking at the perform-
ance or even how we organized the work. If we didn't organ-
ize the work well or have the right performance levels, there
may have been no way that we could have done the work
with four nurses. But now we're being forced to look at
change and it is happening quickly.
She amplified:
Very often when something was introduced, sure there
could be training; sure there could be, "Let's check this;"
"Let's do inter-rater reliabilities." But then the quality con-
trols wouldn't be put in place long term, say a year from now:
"There were 13 steps; are we still doing the 13 steps? Did we
cut down to the 10 but we really shouldn't have?" There
wasn't as vigorous quality checks or controls put in place
over time. We're starting to focus on that more, particularly
in nursing, and its a learning experience.
While the preference of these respondents is to make the new
ethos work, the strain of doing so was evident, particularly in the inter-
views with individuals with significant managerial roles. There was
also occasional skepticism about the new culture (combined with a
tacit acceptance of its terminology):
It may be that I will be able to effect some of these bureau-
cratic changes in restructuring of the whole medical pro-
gram as a product line with its own identifiable service. That
may help or, "be careful of what you wish for; you may get it."
I'll trade one set of problems for another.
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D. Characteristics of Patients and Families
In 40% of the interviews, patient or family characteristics were
mentioned as an important source of conflict. If we include responses
to our questions about the extent to which the inner city context was
problematic, the number is nearly 60%. Respondents complained
about what might be described as the "pathologies" of urban life.
These included drug addiction, severe psychopathology, and disorga-
nized or non-existent family support structures.
Another problematic category were inflexible individuals, includ-
ing litigious people and those with religious values that forbid medical
interventions. (One respondent commented, "It is very hard to
counteract God. I am not that powerful"). At times the "rigidities"
have to do with the family's unswerving demand that the patient con-
tinue to be treated in the hospital when medical judgment says that
the patient would be better off at home or in another facility.
There are also times when the characteristics of patients and fam-
ilies are only problematic in the hospital context. For example, end
of life conflicts are sometimes fueled by geographic distance among
family members, so that a family member who lives far away will also
be emotionally far behind other family members who have been at the
bedside for many days and are thus more ready to "let go." It is also
normal for patients and families to experience significant distress
when medical news is bad. This distress can create conflict because it
clashes with the busy pace of the hospital and the specialization in
medical care, which may make it hard for the hospital to take the time
to arrange an appropriate response to the emotional needs of the
family.
1. The Inner City Environment.
A particular concern of this investigation was to explore the im-
pact of the inner city environment on the dynamics of health care
conflict and its management. Respondents were asked two questions
on this subject: Whether the inner city setting affects the nature of
the conflicts they deal with? Whether to be an effective manager of
conflict in this particular hospital there are important things that it is
useful to know or to know how to do?
Three respondents rejected the idea that the inner city context
played any unique role in fueling conflict or making it harder to man-
age. Their perspective was that "conflict is conflict" wherever it occurs
and that the problems of any city are likely to be similar. For these
respondents "cultural diversity" can be an issue at the hospital (and
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they approved of training staff to manage diversity related conflicts
better) but this is an issue in most health care organizations.
The majority of respondents, however, felt that the specific inner
city environment has a significantly negative impact on conflict within
the hospital. Most of the problems arise from the "pathologies" of the
urban environment noted earlier. In addition, less than a quarter of
the hospital's patients have private insurance or Medicare. Medicaid
and charity care are the major underwriters of patient services. As
one respondent put it, "our demographics are bad."
Respondents described six negative consequences associated with
the hospital's inner city location:
1. Reduced compliance with medical treatments.
2. The creation of pressures on staff to do things that are medi-
cally problematic or financially burdensome to the hospital (e.g., to
give outpatient chemotherapy to a patient with no support network).
3. Staff emotional distress. Dealing with the very sick, very poor,
and socially disorganized people can be very stressful, making it
harder for the staff to be empathic and respond well under tension.
Said one nurse manager:
I was on a nursing unit where there were many homeless pa-
tients and you don't realize the guards these individuals
build up because of the environments in which they have to
survive. I'm remembering how some of the nurses were try-
ing to be nice to this one patient, but that patient would spit
at them .... They don't want to know how it feels for some-
one to be nice, because when they have to go back to their
environment they may need that barrier to survive. Even as a
nurse in a very challenging environment where you get the
sickest of the sick in academic tertiary care, its not just
enough to go in to change your IV and change your chest
tube; you have to also alter how you deal psycho-dynamically
with each patient, so you are constantly on guard. Physically
you are on guard; emotionally you are on guard. It's
stressful.
A family's prior experiences with the hospital can also starkly impact
the kind of communications directed at the staff. A trauma nurse
noted that the crime and tensions of the street are brought directly
into the hospital. In her view, this makes for a very different climate
than the one in hospitals in more benign surroundings. She cited one
example: Often families have had a good deal of experience with the
trauma services. Some of those experiences have involved the death
of a loved one, which triggers statements like, "My so and so was here
and you killed him."
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4. Patient distrust. The socioeconomic and cultural differences
between patients and staff can create problems of trust. A physician
commented:
When there is great educational disparity between doctors
and patient family groups and where there is socio-cultural
disparity that leads to an inherent distrust. Often patient
families are worried that they will be abandoned by their
physicians. That's a peculiarly public hospital mentality.
INTERVIEWER: The patients are worried that they may be
abandoned by their doctors because of their socioeconomic
status?
RESPONDENT: Yes, and because they are black and differ-
ent in those ways; because they have been led all their lives to
believe that they have no right to medical care, they have no
expectation of adequate medical care.
Language differences can also reduce patient confidence that the
hospital cares about their needs. A nurse who was born and raised in
the city, remarked:
We've done a lot with our customer service training, but the
culture [of the hospital] can be very punitive for a person
who doesn't speak English. I want to be careful with this, but
it is real, I tell you. If you don't understand my language
flow and you seem to need more help, I'm already stressed
about that and that conveys itself in how we deal with the
patients. It could be English as a primary language or lim-
ited English proficiency, it doesn't really matter. We, as an
organization, need to get ourselves in line with how we com-
municate because how we communicate is a factor in our
ability to serve a person and meet their needs and have them
walk away with their dignity, as opposed to how sometimes
we talk down and we just belittle them. That is a culture that
still needs a lot of work.
Because of the social and medical conditions associated with pov-
erty, the hospital is also sometimes obliged to take actions which put it
in direct conflict with patients. A nurse who worked in ambulatory
care for many years commented:
You might have to invoke a social hold on a baby because the
mother is not able to take care of the kid. You have to do it,
right then and there. I've been there. "Call Public Safety and
have them get social services up here. Now!" That's conflict.
Here you have someone believing they have a right to do
something and unfortunately, because other people are in-
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volved, minors, we have to do what we have to do to protect
them. Those things are big things.
5. Conflict between the hospital and the community. The
mounting financial pressures on the hospital raises difficult issues with
the community about what the hospital's priorities should be. A re-
spondent with executive nursing responsibilities noted:
[Although] our hospital is no different than any other urban
hospital, it has special characteristics because of the genesis
of this institution on this site. It is very community based and
helped with the growth and the rebuilding after the riots.
That's very much alive; this institution is supporting the com-
munity. That, in and of itself, leads to conflict in terms of
the direction of the hospital. Does it become an institution
that serves only the community, or does it entertain other
ventures that may bring business in to sustain itself finan-
cially? [But] the question comes up. "Would you be denying
care? You were placed here for the community. You can't
deny, even if they can't pay. You need to provide." But
that's why the institution has to bring in payors, because you
can't always provide, particularly if charity care is cut back.
There truly would be limited resources and there wouldn't
be any money left.
6. Conflict with other health care institutions or insurers. We
have already discussed the struggle between hospitals for the well-pay-
ing patient. Our hospital, because of its location and its history of
being a "charity care" institution, is often the place other hospitals try
to send their non-paying patients. A nurse responsible for outpatient
services noted:
We take care of the patients that other people don't want to
take care of for whatever reason. We have some interesting
dynamics with the [names another health care system].
They do some interesting things, yes they do. We have
mechanisms to address that. If we think we have had a pa-
tient dumped on us by another facility, we go to the Medical
Director's office who has the right to make a complaint to
the state department of health and have it be investigated.
So we have a process to get with those folks. You can get
some hefty penalties if you are guilty of doing that. The
thing is that on an out-patient basis, its hard to prove. Some-
times people say, "Oh, go down there. They don't charge."
I have had patients tell me that they told her to drive down
from [a neighboring city] to our hospital because you don't
have to pay if you come here.
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At other times the hospital's conflict is with Medicaid. A manager
in the emergency department described a typical scenario:
Frequently [Medicaid] will say, "They didn't need an ambu-
lance to get to the hospital and they certainly didn't need
the ER." We have this fight with the Medicare/Medicaid de-
nial people all the time. They'll say, "A child had an ear in-
fection, why did the mother call the ambulance?" I'll have to
debate with them to pay the claim. If my kid has an ear in-
fection and I live in the suburbs, I have a car; I have neigh-
bors; I can leave my house and take my kid to the doctor or
to the emergency department by car. They don't have that
resource here. A lot of times the only way they can get access
to health care is through an ambulance because we do not
charge them to come to their house like a cab does.
Although the respondents gave candid, and a times stark assess-
ments of the demands and challenges of working in an inner city
health care setting, the overall impression was of professionals with a
deep commitment to the hospital and the patients it serves. The ad-
vanced practice bereavement specialist captured the flavor of this
stance:
Everything I know about this stuff [how to help people deal
with loss] I learned from the people in this city. Moms and
grandmoms here have taught me everything. You don't have
to go to school and learn this. You just hang out with them.
They are a remarkable people. This lady today - her son is
32 - he was on his bike going to visit her and he got hit by a
car. Thirty-six hours later I am sitting in a room with her and
she gives his eyes, his kidneys, his liver and she says to me, "I
don't want another mother to hurt." Amazing! It just gives
you so much respect for the human condition.
We have described in detail our respondents' accounts of the
types of conflicts in which they intervene and their perceptions of the
forces that fuel those disputes. It is evident from these reports that
there is no single or outstanding cause of the conflicts with which the
hospital must contend. The blame certainly cannot be pinned on
"difficult people," although there was no shortage of people behaving
badly in the cases we heard about. However, from the perspective of
our "ground-zero" observers, the source of the difficulties lies prima-
rily in the complex and highly "flammable" health care environment
in which people function. This environment is the product of a num-
ber of complex and interacting social forces, including aspects of
medical and nursing culture which work against collaborative prob-
lem-solving, dysfunctional organizational dynamics, including signifi-
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cant organizational ambivalence about conflict itself, an increasing
scarcity of resources, and the interpersonal and practical challenges
posed by a poor, culturally diverse, patient population."
However, our respondents are much more than observers of this
problematic terrain. They are also key agents in the hospital's efforts
to deal with its conflicts. It is to this central topic which we now turn.
PART II: STRATEGIES AND CONCEPTS OF INTERVENTION
I. INTRODUCTION
The interviews provided rich details about the activities and stra-
tegic thinking of informal conflict managers in a complex, urban
health care organization. Before proceeding to these matters it will
be useful to briefly review the intervention roles the respondents
played in the cases that were discussed during the interview.
Our primary interest was to better understand the role of infor-
mal mediators of conflict in a health care setting. We therefore asked
(but did not insist) that the respondents select a case to discuss in
which they had played a mediation role. Ten (59%) of the respon-
dents chose such a case. Five of them described disputes in which
they had played the "classical" role of a mediator with no official au-
thority over the disputants; five others discussed cases in which they
mediated as administrators with clear organizational authority over
the parties.22 Another respondent discussed a case of organizational
problem-solving in which his role approximated that of the traditional
mediator in the sense that he had no formal authority over the parties
and was attempting to be the "honest broker" who kept the problem-
solving process on track.2" Six respondents (35%) described conflicts
in which they did not mediate, but either served as a consultant or
coordinator of the activities of others or functioned as a principal ne-
gotiator for themselves or as the representative of their unit.
Although none of the respondents were serving in a formal medi-
ation role, their intervention strategies are well-captured by a typology
which has proved useful in describing the work of professional third
21. See Michael L. Glenn, Structurally Determined Conflicts in Health Care, 5 FAMILY SYS-
TEMS MEDICINE 413, 414-16 (1987) (depicting a detailed account of the multi-dimensional
nature of health care conflict from the perspective of a practicing physician).
22. This kind of intervention has been referred to as "authoritative" mediation. CHRIS-
TOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRAcrcI STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING CON-
FLICT 45-49 (1996).
23. His official role was that of team leader of an inter-departmental task force.
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party intervention in conflict, such as labor mediation, 24 divorce medi-
ation25 or the mediation of medical malpractice disputes.2 6 The typol-
ogy classifies tactics into five major strategic categories: (1)
establishing rapport (2) gaining an understanding of the conflict (3)
improving the climate between the parties (4) addressing the issues,
and (5) applying pressure for resolution.27
The account we present of these five strategies is a composite; not
every respondent talked about each of them. It is also important to
bear in mind that while the typology is useful for descriptive purposes,
it also introduces a number of distortions.
First, the typology suggests a separation of tactical behaviors into
discrete strategic categories, when, in fact, it is often the case that the
same intervention may have been undertaken with more than one
strategic purpose in mind. We have quoted liberally from the inter-
views, partly as a corrective to this impression and partly to convey the
richness, pungency, and occasional humor of the respondents'
language.
Second, a description of the individual categories misses a crucial
quality of the approaches to managing conflict of a good many re-
spondents: Its holistic and structured nature. This important matter
is considered at the end of our account of the strategies and tactics of
intervention, under the heading of "Intervention Schema."
II. ESTABLISHING RAPPORT
Establishing rapport is a fundamental requirement of conflict
management. It is among the first things that professional mediators
describe doing. 28 So it is with our non-professional health care inter-
veners. Respondents described four tactics for establishing rapport.
These included active listening, being immediately helpful, validating
the disputant's concerns, and relating to disputants empathically. A
reputation within the hospital for competence in conflict manage-
ment appeared to significantly augment rapport-building tactics.
24. See generally PeterJ. D. Carnevale, et. al., Contingent Mediator Behavior and it's Effective-
ness of Third Part Intervention, in Kressel & Pruitt, supra note 4 at 213-40; See generally KEN-
NETH KRESSEL, LABOR MEDIATION: AN EXPLORATORY SURVEY (1972).
25. See Kenneth Kressel & Morton Deutsch, Divorce Therapy: An in Depth Survey of Ther-
apists' Views, 16 FAm. PROCESS 413, 424-31 (1977).
26. See generally FELD & SIMM, supra note 5.
27. See id. at 37-40 (explaining various tactics of third party intervention in mediation).
28. Kressel, supra note 4, at 529; MOORE, supra note 22, at 90, 122-24.
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A. Active Listening
Nearly half of the respondents noted the importance of giving
the parties an opportunity to unburden themselves in the presence of
a third party who is "really listening." Examples of active listening
were described as coming very early in the respondents' involvement
and for the purpose of providing an immediate outlet for anger and
other powerful feelings. Listening was frequently described as a cog-
nitive as well as an empathic activity. A high level administrator of
ancillary care services described her first contact with an angry nurse:
Listening is a skill, because as I'm listening I'm thinking:
"What's going to be my next step?" When the nurse walked
into my office I could tell she was upset. Her face was all red
and typically, she's a lovely lady. You could tell she was cry-
ing. She walked in and said, "I just can't take it anymore.
What am I going to do? I'm going to kill her! [the doctor
she was angry at]. This is the kind of written orders I get.
This is ridiculous. How dare she or anybody else do this?
I'm a very good nurse. How dare she demean me in anyway
as unprofessional! I could take her to court." So I'm going
to myself, "Oh boy. This is a handful here!" There are multi-
ple issues: allegations of not doing her job, being unprofes-
sional, sitting in the doctors' office with her feet up on the
desk and a couple of other things. So, as I was listening I was
writing down everything, which is what I usually do. I write
down whatever they're saying. I'm looking at it... listening
and looking. I'm thinking: "What is my next step?"
Several respondents noted that at their hospital, active listening
and empathic efforts generally, are made more difficult by the socio-
economic and ethnic differences between staff and patients in an in-
ner city hospital. A doctor commented:
You have to be willing to listen. You've got to look for nu-
ance. You've got to hear not only what people are saying,
but how they are saying it. You've got to look for "syntax."
I'm not sure if that's more true here, except that in other
hospitals there may be more shared socioeconomic expecta-
tions . . . Societies in which all of these assumptions are
shared don't have to listen so hard for the answers.
B. Being Helpful
Responding to a person's immediate need, whether or not that
need is connected to the dispute, was another popular rapport build-
ing tactic. It was a particular emphasis of respondents who had had
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significant training in bereavement counseling. In The Unwilling
Daughter, the respondent described her first contact with the daughter
who was opposed to the cessation of extraordinary measures to pro-
long her mother's life.
I said [to the attending physician], "Give me a chance to
meet everybody. Let me go 'schmooze."' After 25 years of
doing this, that is more important than anything else. Going
in, sitting down, eyeballing people, and "making nice." I
went into the room and said, "I'm so and so, I work with
families. What do you need?" This is not about my agenda.
I see so many people who screw this up by going in with their
own agenda. She said, "I need help turning my mother." So
we turned her mother. We rubbed her back a little bit. I got
involved with her on that level.
The respondent noted that interventions of this kind are particu-
larly likely to be effective because of the emotional vulnerability of
people in the midst of a medical crisis: "It doesn't take a lot of time if
you meet them where they are and you find out what they need.
Within 20 minutes you can be very connected to a family member
because they are in crisis. They are under such stress that they are
wide open."
Coordinating such interventions with the normal rhythms of the
hospital is also useful: "It was a quiet time - not busy and crazy. That
makes a difference sometimes. All the chiefs go home and they'll
often turn down some lights. Hang around here after 7 p.m."
Being helpful can also be a strategy to overcome resistance to a
particular intervention. In The Gang in the SICU, the trauma nurse
commented on her handling of the nurses' objections to her efforts to
"mediate" between them and the milling mob of gang members. The
respondent had devised a plan to allow the gang members to "say
goodbye" to their dying comrade and then to exit quickly and volunta-
rily from the hospital.
There was only one nurse taking care of him but nurses can
be like a gang. So there were six or seven nurses on that day
and a couple of them had very strong opinions about how
many visitors were coming in. With their manager there, I
explained to them what we were going to do. They were all
going to come in, two at a time, and pay their last respects.
The nurses weren't real happy about it. They'd had enough
visitors. "There [are] things they need to do. Don't I know
there are medications they need to give? If these visitors are
all in there, I can't get in there." [I said], "Then you won't
go in there while we're in, and if you need to do something,
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we'll step out. I'll be here." I went in with each of the
groups and made sure and brought them down the hall.
Another respondent described how her responsiveness helped
calm an angry surgeon. The respondent was a nurse administrator
who had intervened in a complex treatment planning conflict be-
tween a surgeon and a psychiatric patient who was refusing, against
sound medical advice, to consent to the amputation of his leg. She
had inherited the case when she assumed her normal rotation as hos-
pital Administrator on Call (AOC). The surgeon was angry because
the previous AOC had been less than diligent in keeping him in-
formed about the steps the hospital was taking to try to establish a
legal right to do the surgery.
Once he met me and we sat down and he saw what I was
doing and how fast I was responding to him that first day I
found him to be very patient. He just wanted to get [the sur-
gery] done by Wednesday, because he felt that would be rea-
sonable considering that he had had this discussion with
someone else [the prior AOC]. I assured him that I would do
everything I could to work with him and get his patient care
needs done. I told him I'd get back to him in one or two
hours and I did. That was the one thing that was key. He
knew that I was with him because I got back to him every
time I said I would with new information or where I was in
the process. It wasn't like I fell off the face of the earth.
C. Validating
Nearly one third of the respondents spoke of the importance of
making it clear to angry or distressed people that their concerns are
legitimate. Validation of this kind was viewed as an essential means of
establishing the emotional and interpersonal conditions that make
problem solving possible. At times this can be done straightforwardly.
One nurse administrator of an out patient treatment unit put it this
way:
You can't talk to people when they are yelling and scream-
ing. So first you have to calm them down. I say, "You know
what? I'm the person in charge. You should be talking to me.
What's going on? What can I do for you? How can I make
this better?" They begin to talk to me and tell me what they
need to happen. Then I'm able to work it out. "I think I can
do this, but I might not be able to make that happen. What
do you think about X, Y, and Z?" I've usually found that
most of the time people just want someone to hear them.
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They want to know that somebody heard their issue and
thought it was important enough to provide a response to it.
A similar theme was sounded in The Unwilling Daughter. The sec-
ond daughter had been named by the mother as legal proxy in her
advanced directive. This daughter had been stymied by her sister's
opposition to ending extraordinary measures and the medical staff's
avoidance of getting involved for fear of the legal implications. The
respondent described her first meeting with daughter number two:
Both she and her husband came. We went into the confer-
ence room just to meet. I wanted to find out who they were
and their connection with the other sister. She started out
saying that she had the right to do this and I completely ac-
knowledged that. "Absolutely, positively, you're in charge.
But is there a way that we can 'win-win' this; not have zero-
sum game? The other sister has to feel so devastated. Maybe
there's a way to do this a little differently." She began to talk
about it. Her agenda was to get mom off the machines.
That was her agenda. I don't think she felt listened to. Peo-
ple were avoiding her because they knew she was right. I see
her crying and her husband holding her hand. I watched
her go from [makes an angry face] to "How sad this is." I
think this happened because I completely acknowledged
that she was in charge. She didn't have to fight.
Validation can also refer to acknowledging that people have a le-
gitimate right to certain information and a legitimate role in an un-
folding medical drama. The handling of the teenage gang in the
SICU by the trauma nurse illustrates the point. Until her arrival on
the ward, the gang members had been regarded by the staff as an
unwanted and threatening presence.
I went around to all the groups in the hallway and told them
that I needed to meet with them and that we were going to
talk about their friend and I asked them to come into the
waiting room. I introduced myself to them and my role at
the hospital. I told them that I had seen their friend and
met with the family and that I needed their help . . . I
needed them to be on my team. They had ajob to do and I
was going to tell them what the job was and that they needed
to do that job to the best of their abilities. The room was
silent. They were looking at me. Some more angry than
others, but nothing was being directed at me; it was directed
outside of the hospital. They were quiet, listening to every-
thing that I had to say. I think they needed somebody to talk
to. They needed somebody to speak to them - not just ru-
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mors or overhearing or a family member coming out with
whatever information they were willing to share. I was some-
body who represented the hospital and what we were doing
for their friend and telling them what was happening with
him: That he was critically ill and that this gunshot wound
was going to kill him; that he was going to die; that it was
going to happen probably that day. But this was also why
they needed to respect the family. That the family was very
happy that they had come in and that the family wanted to
thank them for being there, but that the family wanted to
spend some time alone.
INTERVIEWER: Had the family authorized you to say that?
RESPONDENT: No, but it felt like the right thing to say.
The manner in which concerns are validated can be crucial. In
this regard, respondents emphasized directness and self-control. "I
sat at this table. I never have a meeting from behind a desk. A desk is
a barrier. I don't want any barriers when I talk to people."
A similar note was struck by another respondent:
My security staff says, "You're hopeless! When something is
going on, you get right in-between. It's hard for us to pro-
tect you if you get right in there!" But you know what? Un-
less I get right there and talk to them, we can't resolve this.
You standing in-between me and them isn't going to help.
That just adds more fuel to the fire. I need to resolve this
quickly and quietly.
The need for self-control, or more precisely, for not responding
to anger with more anger, was a point made repeatedly during the
interviews. The following was a typical comment:
One of the things I've learned is that if you don't fuel it, it
doesn't get worse. Even if you're hollering, you're trying to
say something - you're distressed; something is bothering
you. People just don't act out because nothing is distressing
them. There's something distressing them; you need to lis-
ten to that. I've learned to get quieter ... I can hear you
better when you're not screaming and I'm not concerned for
my safety. We can talk. I can help you. I used to always say,
"If you stop hollering I assure you that I can help you."
Given the upheavals occurring in health care, health care profes-
sionals also need to feel heard. In discussing the lessons to be learned
from a case involving a dispute with shift nurses who were asking for
additional staff, a nursing director noted:
Change is very difficult, and the more planning, the more
communication at any given time, the better. Change is
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something that we can't necessarily control, but we need to
be cognizant of it and to support those individuals through
that process. Even the element of fear. You can't take away
the element of fear from someone. You can't say to some-
one, "Don't be afraid. It's ok," because they are going to be
afraid. The more you discount their feelings and the legiti-
macy of those feelings, the more a communication barrier
arises .... Take this example: The nurse-patient ratio might
have been the symptom, but the cause could have come from
fear and just not even knowing if we are truly addressing
that.
D. Empathic Attunement
We refer to empathic "attunement," rather than empathy, be-
cause respondents described the challenge not so much of being em-
pathetic, but of forming a positive image of individuals whom others
in a conflict situation have presented in a negative light. Once again,
this was a particular emphasis of respondents with training in bereave-
ment counseling. Thus, in The Gang in the SICU, our respondent re-
fused to see the gang members in the same negative way that the
SICU staff did, but rather as young people in the midst of dealing with
death and loss who needed help expressing their grief in a legitimate
way. In the case of The Unwilling Daughter, the respondent was told by
the treating physician that the daughter insisting on continued aggres-
sive treatment was "crazy." The respondent did not want to see her in
that negative light. Her brief visit to the bedside to help the daughter
care for her mother gave the respondent the perspective she was look-
ing for:
I got a sense of how alone she must have been and how
much she must really love her mother. This woman is there
all the time. She wants her not to die. How connected she is
to her .... I felt sad. I really empathized with her because I
heard her pain. She had lived with her mother since the day
she was born and was very connected to her. This was going
to affect her life more than anybody else's. Her whole life
would be different. And I just remember being very sad.
This empathic reframing of the "difficult" daughter also ap-
peared to derive from the respondent's understanding of how "out of
control" most people feel in a medical crisis involving a loved one,
and how easy it is for medical staff, especially inexperienced staff, to
forget this:
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When your ten year old gets hit by a school bus your whole
world is out of control .... Novices usually are feeling so
scared and threatened that one of the first things they do is
get officious. It never works. You have to go in and sit down
and say, "This is awful." You don't have to say, "I'm so im-
portant. I went to this and this school and I know all this."
Who cares?
Another nurse gave a very different example of how important it
is to master negative feelings in the interest of maintaining an effec-
tive professional connection.
Twenty years ago, when I was a nurse out there dealing with
people who didn't want me to do things I needed to do for
them, I had to figure out how to get a compromise. You
have to figure it out. When it comes to adults, adults do have
the right to tell you, "No, I don't want you to touch my
body." I mean, a person said to me, "I don't want you to
touch me because you are black." That's what he said. Now
did it hurt? Oh yeah. I never heard that before in my life.
But ultimately, I just figured out that it was his loss because I
was better - the nurse in me took over.
E. Reputation for Expertise
In several of the cases discussed during the interview, respon-
dents noted that a reputation for expertise within the hospital was an
important element in establishing rapport. In The Patient Who Refused
Amputation, our respondent noted that she was able to win the angry
surgeon over partly because of her medical expertise:
A novice might not have gone back to the charts of old visits
to see history. I think they might have been afraid to go on
the psych unit and spend time with the patient and figure
out where he was. I think that it would have been intimidat-
ing, because here was a surgeon saying, "I've got to do this."
I quantified it by saying to him, "Are you telling me that if
you do not cut the leg off immediately - today - that this
man will die or that he will lose all of his leg?" He couldn't
quantify that; so then I said, "It is not an emergency. It is
urgent, but if you're still telling me there is time to work on
some of these other aspects [such as] identifying next of kin
and trying to get them involved, then you can take him." He
heard me. I think that being a nurse made a difference, be-
cause not all the Administrators On Call are nurses. It made
a difference in that I was able to be a little bit more credible
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to him in terms of what I knew about policy and what I felt
was the right way to manage this.
A similar dynamic was at work in The Unwilling Daughter
I was an ICU nurse so I really know the physiology pretty
well. That has been immeasurably helpful with credibility
with the staff. I can work the machines if I have to. They are
updated versions but I know what they do. It has helped me
very much in explaining things to families. I understand it.
When I go to the chart I can read the crazy notes and I know
what it means.
She has several other sources of influence within the institution.
She was among those who drafted the legislation in the state gov-
erning end of life medical decision-making and she helped train most
of the senior medical staff on these issues when they were at earlier
stages in their careers.
I was here 10 years ago when a lot of these guys were "babies"
and just coming through. Now they are all in charge of
trauma and the leaders of this and the head of that. They'll
say to whomever is under them, "Whatever she tells you to
do, you do. You hear me?" That helps a lot - that informal
and formal power.
II. COGNITIVE SCHEMA FOR ESTABLISHING RAPPORT
Although we have described a variety of tactics for establishing
rapport, one or two respondents described rapport building in terms
which make it plain that the individual tactics flow from an underlying
cognitive schema. Here, for example, is a nurse describing what she
means by "active listening:"
I think that people really need to listen. They need to be
listening "actively," as they say. Don't try to solve an issue just
by hearing it. Give that person the latitude to say it. Clarify
if you don't think that you heard everything or to be sure:
"Are you telling me that... ?" Let them keep giving you that
feedback. Then it changes the dynamics and people know
that you are really listening and you're hearing them. If you
can't resolve it, tell them that you're going to get back to
them. But be reasonable. People just need to know: "I
couldn't get it done right there and then, but in two hours
somebody is going to give me a document or a call or some-
thing." That is one of the things I would do - just listen
more actively - I wish somebody would do it with me!
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It is clear from this account that in the respondent's mind, 'just
listening" is a skill that is not only uncommon in her hospital experi-
ence, but one that involves an orderly progression of several different
tasks: listening, clarifying through summary statements, and provid-
ing information on how she plans to be responsive.29 We shall return
later to the topic of intervention schema of a more encompassing
kind and the crucial role they play in guiding tactical behavior.
III. GAINING AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONFLICT
These are interventions designed to "educate" the intervener
about the nature of the dispute and possible directions for effective
action. Failing to gather sufficient information about a conflict was
listed as a significant mistake. A nursing supervisor commented:
I've learned over the years of being in administration that
you've got to get the facts and listen to the stories first, be-
cause I myself sometimes jump to conclusions and make -de-
cisions based on things that I think or hear, instead of
getting all the facts. I find that when I do receive all the
facts, the decision is usually different than when I just re-
spond. I try to step back and take some time and absorb the
facts first.
In several instances, respondents described the important role
which subtle visual or emotional cues played in giving them a clearer
understanding of the challenges they would face in intervening.
In The Demeaning Doctor the respondent described the impression
she formed in her first meeting with the physician:
This is a person who walked into the room clutching her
chest - both hands folded over her chest - and never looked
at me at all; looked at the floor, the table, the lamp; looked
at everything but me. To me, this was a really angry, frus-
trated individual who, for some reason, hasn't had her needs
met.
The visual impact convinced the respondent that the physician's rigid
personal style was a major issue that would have to be factored into
the management of the conflict.
29. In a pilot interview, a respondent with much experience in training health care
professionals discussed his explicit teaching of a schema for handling patient complaints
very much like the one quoted in the text:
RESPONDENT: "Listen. Repeat back to show you have heard. Empathize, apologize, tell
them what you can do to rectify the situation. Don't tell them what you are not going to
do! And thank them for bringing the problem to your attention."
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The most dramatic examples of the diagnostic value of visual cues
comes from The Gang in the SICU. The respondent described her first
impressions of the unit from the office of the alarmed secretary whose
phone call had summoned her:
She has this office that's outside the main hallway, so all of
this traffic was going back and forth from her room. So it
was a good place to start, because I could already get a sense
of what was happening. Even without her telling me any-
thing, I was already seeing it. You could sense the tension in
people's voices. They were angry and upset. You could just
hear the kids out in the hall and the fast pace up and back;
yelling to each other. Every few minutes, the door would
open and more kids would step off onto the floor.
INTERVIEWER: What were you thinking?
RESPONDENT: Who's down at the desk? Where's Security?
They were just giving out passes and there was open access
all over the place. If it wasn't controlled or resolved it was
going to get out of hand. It was going to be, if it wasn't al-
ready, a dangerous environment.
On occasion, subjective "intuitions" served as diagnostic triggers.
A nursing administrator used such cues in a conflict with nurses who
were demanding additional staff. The respondent recalled that she
had been with the nursing director of the unit in question an hour
earlier and the director had said nothing to her about a change in
patients that would require additional staff.
She and I were here until around 7 PM, so I knew if some-
thing was really wrong, she would have told me. My gut said,
"I need to make sure that I didn't miss something. Did I
miss a cue earlier that totally went over my head; that I
should have responded to or heard differently?"
Based on this intuitive reaction she sent a clinical nurse specialist
down to the unit to do a thorough review of the immediate staffing
needs.
The respondent then became aware that she was angry; the same
problem had occurred several times earlier in the week with the same
group of nurses.
At that point I was kind of angry too. I think the anger was
out of frustration. A smooth transition would have demon-
strated that there is open communication [between the two
nursing shifts on the unit]; there is the ability to have that
open exchange. That's not something little; that's major.
That something "major" didn't happen. We've got a bigger
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issue at hand, because you are dealing with people whose
perceptions aren't in sync.
The anger led her to review her experience with the nurses in
more detail, which led to the outline of a plan for reengaging them in
a new way:
Over the past eight months I've actually had six different
meetings with the staff on this unit. It's a small group.
Sometimes when you've got fewer people there are more in-
terpersonal issues that come up .... There have been spe-
cial meetings in regards to criterion [for staffing] for
different patients. For this to have occurred [these efforts]
weren't working. We may have to do something more tangi-
ble and actually have different case studies that they can do.
Literally, instead of just talking about it, but having some-
thing more concrete; some objective measurement; trying
different learning and educational strategies.
IV. IMPROVING THE CLIMATE BETWEEN THE PARTIES
An important aspect of our respondents' activities were attempts
to modify the "context" surrounding a dispute in the hopes that the
parties would be better able to work their own way to a constructive
solution. This is a central strategy of professional mediators. 30 Ten
respondents (59%) described such interventions. The tactics used to
improve the climate were of three kinds coaching, consultation, and
opening communication channels.
A. Coaching
As noted earlier, respondents identified conflict avoidance as a
significant obstacle to the constructive management of conflict. Help-
ing people deal more directly with their differences was therefore a
frequently discussed intervention. One nurse manager described how
she tries to coach physicians to deal with people with whom they disa-
gree. First, she appeals to the doctor's ego (e.g., pointing out the cen-
tral role the physician plays in hospital management); then she
encourages the physician to deal directly with the person with whom
they are in conflict; finally, she makes sure to praise any efforts that
are successful. At other times, the conflict phobic physician may be
coached in more directive ways. A respondent described how she as-
sisted a director of a medical department to intervene in a conflict
between one of his staff doctors and a nurse. The respondent had
30. Kressel, supra note 4 at 533.
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formulated a plan to mediate the dispute. The director liked her
plan, but he was worried about implementing it.
It was very difficult for him to be able to manage the conflict.
For one thing, a lot of these medical guys don't know how to
deal with this stuff. They rely on the administrator to do it.
But he's an open, honest, forthright individual. He knew
that this was his department to run, supervise, deal with; it's a
very important department. Although he idolized both of
them, he knew there was a conflict and he couldn't tolerate
it anymore. He knew something had to be done. So when I
came to him with the plan, he liked the idea .... I said,
"What do you want me to be? Do you want to lead it or do
you want me to do it?" He said, "No, you can do it." I said,
"Why don't we do it together?" He agreed to that, but I did
most of the talking (laughs)!
Nurses may also need help overcoming their inclinations to avoid
conflict. An emergency room nurse-administrator described model-
ing for her nurse managers how to apply discipline fairly and how to
analyze situations in terms of authority, responsibility, and accounta-
bility so that their inclinations to avoid giving negative feedback to
their subordinates are minimized. At other times she teaches more
directly:
I actually give managers some phrases to use, like "I'm really
uncomfortable with your performance. You failed to docu-
ment the vital signs that were required every hour." If they
meet with the staff and the staff is just, "Well, I'm sorry," you
have to go beyond that. "I hear that you're saying that you
are sorry, but what will you do in the future? How will you
handle this?"
B. Consultation
Although they are experienced managers of conflict, our respon-
dents were not averse to seeking help from others. At times they
reach out to confirm that their own strategy or position is sound. An
Executive Director of a major outpatient service commented:
I like to collaborate with people. I don't like to do anything
unilaterally. I like to be sure I have a consensus as much as
possible before I go into a situation. I either consult with a
human resources person or the director of the department
or with the manager. "This is what I'm going to do. Do you
see anything that may be a weakness in it?"
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Consultation was a particularly prominent strategy in disputes
over treatment planning. Our oncologist respondent consulted with a
hospital bio-ethicist about her reluctance to accept the referral from
radiology of a terminally ill drug abuser.
I was looking for some validation. Was it okay or was I totally
off base? Sometimes you just wonder when you take a stand.
"Am I nuts? Everyone else seems to be going along with it.
Am I off my rocker?" He told me point blank that I didn't
have to give this treatment. In his estimation, an active drug
abuser was a patient to be concerned about. He just vali-
dated my concerns and that I was not ethically bound to give
the treatment, especially since it wasn't life saving or life-pro-
longing at this point.
In The Patient Who Refused Amputation, our nurse Administrator
On Call sought guidance from the hospital's legal department on a
number of important issues, including whether or not to seek legal
authority as the patient's court appointed guardian or to invoke a le-
gal claim that an emergency or life-threatening situation was involved.
Another respondent, who was a member of the legal department, de-
scribed what he considered to be his most important role in treatment
planning disputes:
I think it is being a sounding board. Making the social work-
ers comfortable that they have covered the legal aspects and
that they aren't missing something. So that they feel com-
fortable putting their plan into work. I think getting them to
that comfort level is probably the most important contribu-
tion we make. Also, just having somebody else to discuss
these issues with to make sure they are on the right track.
C. Opening Channels of Communication
Helping the parties share information is a well-documented activ-
ity of professional mediators.3 1 It was an important activity for our
informal conflict interveners as well.
Controlling the flow of communication was a prominent activity
in end of life conflicts, a field in which bereavement specialists and
bio-ethicists typically "mediate" at meetings involving family members
and medical staff. These meetings are often convened for the express
purpose of overcoming the parties' anxiety and uncertainty about how
to engage with each other that are typical in such cases, and to insure
that all the relevant medical, practical, and emotional "facts" are put
31. Kressel supra note 4 at 533; MOORE supra note 22 at 166-68, 257.
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on the table. 32 Two of our respondents described end of life decision-
making conflicts in which they played this role.
Respondents mediating interpersonal conflicts also described ef-
forts to promote information exchange. The mediator of one such
dispute explained her preference for joint as opposed to separate
meetings with the parties. "Separate meetings never work, because no
one is listening to the other person. You want to let them hear each
other. Let them hear each other's anger. Let them go through the
grieving process, whatever that is. And let them build their bridge at
that point.
33
The important part that third parties can play in orchestrating
the flow of communication in a complex health care setting came
from conflicts around treatment planning. The most dramatic illus-
tration is from The Patient Who Refused Amputation.
Serving as the Administrator On Call, and eventually, as the pa-
tient's legal guardian, the respondent became involved in a dizzying
round of activities. These interventions began with a diligent search
for next of kin. Ultimately the search disclosed that the patient had
one surviving relative, a sister. Locating the sister was not easy, how-
ever, since brother and sister had lost contact with each other years
earlier. Eventually, the respondent tracked down the sister and, since
the woman had neither telephone nor means of transportation, ar-
ranged with a local police department to bring the sister to the hospi-
tal. The respondent then convened a meeting between the sister and
the patient's attending surgeon and consulting psychiatrist to discuss
the patient's medical situation.
The respondent described the moral stance that informed these
activities:
Ultimately, I would not like to think that we're just going to
do anything to anybody, even if the physicians are giving us
medical reasons. I would want to be assured that we did eve-
rything that we could to find next of kin. It is a sad thing to
call a next of kin and be told, "Well, I don't talk to them, so
you're wasting your time talking to me." There's such strain
in some families that that is a problem. You don't have a
32. See NANCY N. DUBLER & LEONARD J. MARCUS, MEDIATING BIOETHICAL DISPUTES: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE (1994); See Mary B. West &Joan M. Gibson, Facilitating Ethics Case Review:
What Ethics Committees Can Learn from Mediation and Facilitation Techniques, I CAMBRIDGE
QUARTERLY OF HEALTHCARE ETHICS 63, 63-64, 69-70.
33. It is interesting to note the reference to the "grieving process." As we had repeated
occasions to observe, in the health care field the most visible concepts about conflict man-
agement appear to come from the bioethical approach to end of life disputes. Health care
professionals who have had this training apply it to other types of conflict situations.
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proxy for health care or any of those things. It is difficult to
figure out what's best to do in their interest when they aren't
able to speak for themselves. That's one of the reasons pa-
tients' rights and advocacy are big things for me; and that's
why usually I take the stands I do. Before I do anything, I'm
going to exhaust every possible way, because I think that's
right. I owe that person that before any decision is made.
When it became clear at this meeting that the sister was herself
suffering from a neurological disorder which made her an unsuitable
legal guardian, there ensued another, more complex round of activi-
ties aimed at getting the respondent appointed as the patient's legal
guardian and identifying the patient's treatment options. To this end,
the respondent convened several multi-party meetings and confer-
ence calls involving physicians, a deputy attorney general, the pa-
tient's court appointed lawyer, and a series of judges at higher and
higher levels of appeal. She also insured that the appropriate docu-
ments were in the hands of these medical and legal actors and that
the judicial instructions or decisions made at each meeting were car-
ried out.
Once a final legally binding decision to proceed with the amputa-
tion was made the respondent was then charged with ensuring that
the directive was carried out according to court order. This involved
additional coordinating activities (e.g., enlisting the hospital Medical
Director to insure that the surgery was performed on a weekend, per
court order). After six weeks of more or less non-stop activities the
respondent's arduous role was at an end - or, as she put it, with a
satisfied laugh, "Yes, six weeks was over. My 52-year-old baby went
home."
V. ADDRESSING THE ISSUES
Although practitioners of formal mediation differ as to the appro-
priateness of the mediator expressing a point of view about the sub-
stance of the conflict, 4 addressing the issues in some fashion is an
inevitable part of the third party role.3 5 Two-thirds of our respon-
dents described issue-related interventions in their accounts of the
conflicts in which they were involved. These interventions were of
34. ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: RE-
SPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT (1994); Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding
Mediators' Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REv. 7 (1996).
35. Kressel, supra note 4, at 533-34.
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three major kinds: persuasive appeals, precipitating a decision, and
monitoring agreements.
A. Persuasive Appeals
Although the persuasive arts are often described as essential to
adroit mediation,36 relatively few respondents described such activity
(unless "arm twisting" is to be counted among the persuasive arts.
Two respondents did, however, describe conflicts in which marshaling
evidence and persuading others of its meaning were central activities.
In these conflicts, however, the respondents functioned not as
mediators, but as advocates.
For one respondent, the head of a medical unit, the issue was to
improve the effectiveness of his service by convincing the chairman of
another medical service to provide more timely surgical assistance to
his physicians.
I think between the time I set up the meeting [with the other
chief of service] I had data. I wouldn't have walked into that
meeting without data in regards to: "Look, here are the
pulmonologists. They're not doing great, but they're doing
a lot better than you guys. I'm not happy with Dr. C's service
but it is much better than yours." The part that was some-
what daunting is that this is early on in my tenure. There is
deference to Dr. B because of age and stature. He is chair-
man of a department and I'm a division head. Academically
I felt somewhat junior. On the other hand, I felt I had the
moral high ground, which is always a good place to be.
The respondent was also keenly aware of the fact that the persuasive-
ness of his argument was greatly enhanced by the fact that his service
provided much income for the department with which he was
negotiating.
The most detailed account of the tactics of persuasion was sup-
plied by an administrator with responsibilities for emergency medical
services. At the request of very high-ranking officers of the hospital,
she successfully refuted the accusation of another health care system
that the hospital's EMS, through its region wide ambulance service,
was diverting the patients with the best insurance coverage to itself.
She accomplished this through a very detailed analysis of the data on
hospital emergency admissions in and around the city and was able to
demonstrate that the variability in patient admissions had nothing to
36. Christopher Honeyman, In Practice: Five Elements of Mediation, 4 NEGOTIATION J.
149, 154 (1988).
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do with bias on the part of the EMS service, but was a direct function
of a number of social, political, and economic forces over which EMS
had no control (e.g., as a result of the increased use of automobile
seat belts and the barriers to using the ER put in place by managed
care, emergency room admissions were down everywhere, not just in
the facilities that were claiming bias).
This was survival. They were accusing us of "cherry picking"
patients. We're in contract negotiations with the city. Tim-
ing is everything. I don't think the timing of the allegation
was an accident; in addition to the fact that we get the same
pool of money for charity care that [the other hospital sys-
tem] is competing for. Last year the state took $9 million of
charity care money from us and gave $9 million of it to other
hospitals. The redistribution of the pie. Maybe initially the
people that made the accusation believed it, because on the
surface when you looked at the numbers, the numbers of
EMS patients to [the other hospital system] were down.
Sometimes smoke screens are effective. In this case it wasn't,
because we killed them with the facts and the data.
She increased the impact of her persuasive message by gathering
information about the "human" side of the drama.
I called in paramedics and EMTS and asked them: "Where
are patients going? Why are you bringing them?" I talked to
the people who are in the ambulances with the patients.
Talking to the staff is so important. They can tell you what's
going on. They can tell you why a patient from this sector is
going here and not there. They know! All you have to do is
ask them - and we did.
The success of her effort paid a number of dividends. First, her
stock went up with high level administrators:
As much work as this has been, its been positive for me and
for my department, because the guy who was giving me the
projects and is negotiating my contract with the city and is
also a key decision-maker in possibly shrinking my service, is
probably our best advocate as a result of this.
Second, the experience increased morale in her department.
I have people that are data people and I have people that are
field people and I have a lot of people in between. There's a
whole lot of skill sets .... We really worked hard .... And I
brought those people with me to the presentation. We all
felt good when we walked out the door. We all knew; no one
had to tell us. It was a success. We felt it; we knew it. It was
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good for all of us as an organization to go through. I think it
made us stronger.
B. Precipitating a Decision
Approximately 70% of our respondents had significant manage-
rial responsibilities. Well over half of these individuals described in-
terventions by which they acted decisively to bring a conflict to closure
when practical, legal, or emotional circumstances were hindering the
parties from embarking on a course of action. These interventions
were enacted with varying degrees of pressure, ranging from mild to
intense.
Among the milder interventions was that of a respondent who
described his role as the hospital legal consultant, in assisting the so-
cial work and medical staffs implement a discharge plan for sending a
quarrelsome patient to a facility in another state by airplane (The Diffi-
cult Duo). The plan, which had consumed long hours and weeks of
work by many people, was still proving worrisome to some of the staff,
who were concerned about liability issues and the patient's uncooper-
ative mother. When asked what he saw as the major lesson of the case,
our respondent replied:
The major lesson for me is that sometimes you just need
somebody to make a decision as to how to proceed. In this
case the social worker did an excellent job in making con-
tacts and wanted somebody to say, "Let's go with this. Let's
get this patient out of state. Let's send him to Florida. We
have limited choices here. Let's make a'decision on a practi-
cal basis. We've covered the legal issues .... " We took a
little bit of a chance here because it could very well have
been that if nobody was there to meet this person when the
plane landed, we could have gotten this person back. People
were creating all kinds of scenarios: "They're going to sue us
because we weren't taking proper care." We did do every-
thing we were supposed to do. I would say, from a lot of
these cases, it comes down to a pragmatic decision. Some-
times we have had to talk to a patient's family as lawyers and
say, "Look, if you don't do something to get this patient out,
we're just going to transfer the patient." You sometimes have
to take matters into you own hands.
A more vigorous application of decision-making pressure was de-
scribed in the end of life conflict we have referred to as The Unwilling
Daughter. A part of the respondent's strategy was forging a rapid emo-
tional bond with the older daughter, which we described earlier.
These actions, however, were only a necessary prelude to the heart of
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the respondent's strategy, which played itself out in a bioethics com-
mittee meeting that the respondent had convened.
I opened with a time frame so that everybody heard the same
thing. You're not sneaky. A time frame of when we're going
to turn off the machines. We say that in front of everybody.
We can do that with a plan, with the [unwilling] daughter
right there so she doesn't feel left out .... And she asked
for a half hour alone with her mother and we could give her
that. Then she also asked that the rabbi pray with her at the
bedside. So we were able to give her that. At the meeting
when I went around and asked her what she needed, those
were the three things. The first was, "I need my mother."
Then I said, "I wish that we could do that, but we can't." And
I remember saying, "if we are going to disconnect her from
the ventilator this afternoon, what do you need?" "I need
time with her."
INTERVIEWER: Why did you pick "this afternoon?"
RESPONDENT: It was time .... I think they [the medical
staff] would have kept her there until her heart stopped be-
cause they think they're going to get sued.
C. Monitoring and Follow-Up
Several respondents observed that conflicts can reemerge if the
agreements reached are not monitored. It is an important part of the
third party role to see that this gets done. Thus, monitoring the im-
pact of the task force's pilot plan was an explicit and formal part of
the intervention in The Missing Medical Supplies. The administrator
who mediated the conflict in The Demeaning Doctor, commented:
I always do follow-ups because it keeps things on the right
track. It's the scientific process that I'm used to. You set up
a plan, develop it, implement it, and then follow it up. [A
month later] we asked how things were going. For the most
part they both felt things were better. "Dr. __. is giving me
the orders appropriately. I don't have to go back and ask
her a second and third time what she meant. She's not
nasty. She's very professional and I'm happy with that." The
doctor was a little quiet, but she said things are working well.
VI. APPLYING PRESSURE FOR RESOLUTION
The use of pressure tactics is among the more controversial issues
in the literature on formal mediation. On the one hand, a prevailing
ideology of mediation eschews such mediator behavior. In this view,
the mediator's principal tools are reason and compassion. Ideology
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notwithstanding, there is plentiful evidence that many professional
mediators engage in considerable arm twisting, particularly when the
level of conflict is intense, when values important to the mediator are
at stake, and when the mediator has considerable formal authority.37
The interviews indicate that what is true for the professional me-
diator is also true for the experienced, non-professional mediator of
health care conflict. Of the eleven respondents who discussed a case
in which they served as an informal mediator, all but two described
the use of pressure tactics. The use of such tactics was associated with:
* unusually difficult circumstances, including conflicts involving ex-
tremely rigid, polarized parties or parties who were overly timid and
avoidant.
* conflicts between individuals which threatened to spread and dis-
rupt the functioning of larger units.
• conflicts which compromised medical care or had dragged on so
long that important emotional or institutional needs were being
blocked.
" disputes which raised the genuine possibility of a law suit.
The interpersonal conflicts, all of which involved feuding staff,
were especially likely to provoke highly assertive interventions de-
signed to help the parties "get along" for the sake of delivering quality
medical care. Four major types of pressure tactics were described: Re-
minding the parties about "reality," insisting that they confront their
differences, threatening transfer or dismissal, and compelling compli-
ance.
A. Reminding the Parties About "Reality"
The intensity of the parties' anger and self-righteousness can lead
them to lose sight of important "realities." It is the role of the inter-
vener to bring such "realities" forcefully to their attention. 38  The
Demeaning Doctor provides several excellent examples of this reality
orienting function. The respondent described her tactic for compel-
ling the physician to abandon her defensive posture and to participate
in an informal mediation of the nurse's complaints:
She's a very negative lady. "Why do we have to meet?
There's nothing to discuss." I said, "Your accusations have a
potential for liability. We need to clear that up with the em-
37. Deborah M. Kolb & Kenneth Kressel, The Realities of Making Talk Work, in WHEN
TALK WORKS: PROFILES OF MEDIATORS 479, 479-83 (1994); see Kressel & Pruitt, supra note 4,
at 419.
38. Kolb & Kressel, supra note 37, at 479-83.
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ployee and probably you need to apologize after this, but I
want to hear what you have to say." That did it. She came in.
She got scared because when you start making allegations
about people's professionalism, people aren't afraid to go to
an attorney.
Later in this initial meeting, our respondent again supplied a
dose of "reality" in reacting to the doctor's continuing inflexibility.
It was a hard meeting because she felt she was absolutely
right .... There came a point in the conversation where I
said, "Doctor, there's going to have to come a point in time
where you are going to have to understand that some of
these things may damage you because you can't prove any-
thing. I'm not asking you to not believe that you are right,
but rather to understand that whether you are right or
wrong, this person has the evidence that she's telling the
truth. Either way, I'm here to tell you that if you're going to
work together, you are going to have to change the way you
deal with each other."3 9
B. Insisting That The Parties Confront Their Differences
Since the respondents viewed the parties' tendency to avoid con-
flict as one of the major obstacles to the constructive management of
hospital conflicts, it is not surprising that overcoming this inclination
was an important challenge. At times, that challenge was met force-
fully. The Demeaning Doctor provides another handy example:
We made them talk to each other. "I want you to tell Dr. __
how you feel." And she told her. Dr. __ listened and we
asked her the same thing .... Each one of them had the
opportunity to talk to the other with those of us in the room
that were closest to them. The nurse expressed how deeply
upset she was with this doctor for the way she talked to her
and accused her, and just because she sat in the doctor's of-
fice with her feet up, that that's none of the doctor's busi-
39. A more extreme, not to say almost comical, example of the reality orienting func-
tion came from one of the pilot interviews with an administrator of an outpatient service.
She described the following exchange with a physician about a patient who was com-
plaining about the doctor's failure to appear for two previous scheduled appointments:
DR. (to our respondent): "I just wanted to know, if I hit him you all will back me up, right?"
RESPONDENT: "Excuse me! If you hit that patient we will nail your behind to the wall.
We will be co-complainants with the patient to sue you. Do you understand?"
DR.: "What are you talking about?"
RESPONDENT: "To hit a patient? We will never agree for you to hit a patient! Do you
know what the liability of that is - to tell you that it is okay to hit a patient! No. You can't
hit a patient and a patient can't hit you."
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ness. And the doctor said, "It is my business because I don't
think it's professional. Maybe I didn't tell you personally."
(Because what the doctor did was tell everybody else, which
made for suspicions that there was something going on be-
tween the medical director and the nurse, which certainly
wasn't true). I felt good because they were able to open up
and express how pissed off they were with each other. They
were really angry with each other.
INTERVIEWER: Did it make things worse or better?
RESPONDENT: It didn't make things worse. It made both
of them realize that what they were talking about was incon-
sequential when it came to the big picture. It's about patient
care and how we feel about each other and how we're treat-
ing each other, and, "you know what, maybe this is stupid."
C. Threatening Transfer or Dismissal.
Threats of dismissal were among the most coercive tactics de-
scribed during the interviews. They were typically considered as last
resorts with parties whose intransigent behavior posed serious threats
to morale or competent care.
In Power Trip in the ER, our respondent first tried to coach the less
assertive nurse to stand up for herself against the bullying co-worker
who was demanding that she give up some of her vacation time.
When that proved unsuccessful, the respondent tried to encourage
mutual problem-solving in joint meetings. This too failed. The older
nurse remained insistent; the younger nurse timid and unexpressive.
Finally, the respondent felt obliged to play a stronger card. She told
them both that if they did not resolve their differences and work "pro-
fessionally," one of them would be transferred. This tactic ended the
open warfare that had begun to permeate the ER, but the prior
friendship of the two nurses was ended. Our informant was rueful, if
resigned, about her intervention:
I felt disappointed that it hadn't gone the way I wanted it to
and I was thinking, "This is it, though. Once something like
this happens and starts involving other staff, it can really lead
to other things and involve so many people." Before you
know it, it's one side against the other side, over a stupid
thing .... Things don't always go as I plan or want or in the
direction I'm heading. I wanted it to just settle nice and easy
and everybody to be friends, but life isn't like that.
Actual dismissal of a kind was reported by two respondents in end
of life situations. In both cases, the conflict involved physicians who
refused to follow family wishes. For example, one respondent de-
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scribed a situation in which a daughter's desire to have her dying fa-
ther taken off life supports was opposed by a cardiologist in
inappropriate and harsh language, "Why do you want to murder your
father?" The physician's strong arm tactics so incensed our respon-
dent that, in her role as a hospital bereavement specialist, she ar-
ranged to have the physician removed from the case. As she
explained it: "When you hurt the family unnecessarily, I turn into a
crazy Irish woman. You don't want to mess with me when you hurt the
family."
D. Compelling Compliance: The Application of "Torquemada's Law"
At times, the intensity of the conflict and the mandates of the
respondent's formal administrative role, led to the strenuous applica-
tion of pressure to insure compliance with a solution of the respon-
dent's devising. Most of these instances were in disputes involving
physicians. In a pilot interview for this study, a respondent from an-
other hospital who was responsible for handling patient complaints,
described one such intervention. The conflict was between a cardiolo-
gist who told the patient that surgery was mandatory, and a pulmono-
logist who was opposed to the surgery. Because of this disagreement,
the patient had been prepared twice, one day after the other, with no
surgery taking place. The next day the patient's family came to the
hospital, confused and "livid:"
I went to the nurse manager on the floor and I said, "What is
going on here?" She said that it was between the doctors. I
pulled the doctors together and I said, "I'm sorry to bring
you in here, but something has got to happen .... I asked if
she was on the schedule today to be operated on. The doc-
tors said "no." I said, "What are you going to do about it?"
The pulmonologist finally agreed that her lungs had cleared
out and they took her into the operating room after they left
my office. I went back up to the floor and explained the
whole thing [to the family]. I said, "I'm sorry. It was a lack
of communication. I pulled the doctors together and your
mother will be operated on within the hour."
INTERVIEWER: Why did the physicians accept your
presence?
RESPONDENT: Because [the hospital CEO] told them. I'm
totally empowered to do what I need to do to set things
straight. I have never had one time where [the CEO] did
not support me.
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In The Demeaning Doctor, our respondent described a similar "one-
two" punch, pairing an explicit directive (the "plan of action") with
the not so veiled power of the Medical Director:
I led off the meeting. The Medical Director said what he
had to say and we presented what we believed would be a
plan of action that would allow both of them to work in the
same department and establish that they are both profession-
als .... It's hard to do that. Once you damage a relation-
ship, it's hard to put it back together, and we said that.
"Once you have a scar and you are hurt it's hard to start from
scratch, but we're asking you to do that. We're asking you to
start your relationship over, and whether or not you like
each other, you need to put that aside and deal with the pro-
fessionalism issue of learning how to work well together."
The most straightforward rationale for the application of pres-
sure in the interest of compliance was provided by a physician admin-
istrator who was often frustrated by the countervailing power of other
physicians, as well as the vagaries of dealing with the hospital bureau-
cracy. His case is instructive, because it illustrates both the appeal to
the harried health care administrator of applying pressure and the
limitations of this tactic.
From his perspective, one of the major problems in health care is
"the failure of leadership to lead." He cited as a case in point the
conditions which prevailed in his department just prior to his assum-
ing the directorship. The system of transferring patient care from one
physician to another "was a sort of free for all." When the admitting
surgeon left duty, the case was passed to the next on-service attending
and so on down the line. The result, in his view, was "poor care with
not a lot of accountability." When he became Director he simply man-
dated a change in this policy and led it himself by following the new
procedure which kept the patient under one doctor's continuing
care. This was not a popular decision. Many on his staff did not "buy
in" to the change (some resigned) nor did he try to negotiate with
them:
I think at times the best way to mediate conflict is that people
in authority should have the moral belief and vision and for-
titude to persuasively argue their cause and hold people to a
standard that they hold for themselves and follow it through.
In fact, conflict resolution that requires a lot of mediation
and dancing and negotiation is usually conflict among peers
or near equals. There is also conflict resolution among une-
quals. In this case, and in any Fortune 500 company, your
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boss does not mediate conflict with you. Your boss, if he or
she is a good boss, sets a standard.
He summarized this philosophy, somewhat tongue in cheek, by
invoking the Spanish Inquisition and what he referred to as the appli-
cation of "Torquemada's Law:" "When you know you're right you
have the moral obligation to bend people to your will." If this motto
was followed more often in health care, he concluded, "there would
be less angina and more time to sip cappuccino on the veranda."
E. Wariness About Pressure Tactics
Despite the appeal of pressure tactics, there is ample evidence
that our respondents often had mixed feelings about their use. When
asked for pitfalls that a novice might make in the case they chose to
discuss, more than half the respondents cited the ill-advised use of
pressure. Even the enthusiastic proponent of "Torquemada's Law"
had his doubts. He phrased his reservations in terms of another
motto which he found appealing, this one from the United States
Navy Seals: "Lead from the front." To which he wryly added, "but
don't get too far out in front or you'll be a target for your own peo-
ple." Since becoming Director he has learned that "conflict resolu-
tion and getting people to agree is just hard work."
One thing that makes managing conflict "work" is that he does
not always have the authority over others to make the application of
pressure feasible; another is clinical ambiguity. He cited his monthly
departmental meeting to which he invites physicians from other de-
partments and which he instituted to "mediate" conflicts over clinical
matters. It does not go easily. The problem extends beyond the fact
that he has limited authority over doctors from other departments:
"There's nothing in medicine that says you have to treat a patient a
certain way. You have to come to these things slowly. These are much
more akin to the Palestinians and the Israelis. These are the ones I
can't use 'Torquemada's Law' on."
A primary solution to the dangers and limitations of pressure tac-
tics is to attempt to establish rapport and a working alliance with the
parties before attempting to overcome their resistance.40 This ap-
proach does not always work; it seems to have failed, for example, in
Power Trip in the ER, where the antagonistic nurses ceased overt hostili-
ties, but lost their friendship. But when it does work it can be an effec-
tive combination. Reflecting on her role in The Gang in the ER, our
respondent put it this way:
40. Kolb & Kressel, supra note 37, at 479-83.
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As a younger me, I would yell right back at people. My anger
would escalate with their anger just to prove who was in
charge or who could push who around. At this point in my
life, managing this one, I knew it wasn't about that. I can be
in charge of the situation without pushing them around. I
can get them to buy into a plan.
INTERVIEWER: What's the key to doing that?
RESPONDENT: I think a big part is communicating. I think
they [the gang members] believed me. I was very sincere
with them and very honest. I was going to tell them news
that maybe nobody else had told them. "He was going to die.
This is your last opportunity." I think being sincere is a big
part of it. Talking directly to them. Notjust sending a police
officer with a message, but coming in myself.
VII. INTERVENTION SCHEMA
Categorizing tactical interventions into the strategic categories of
establishing rapport, understanding the conflict, improving the cli-
mate, addressing the issues and applying pressure is useful for descrip-
tive purposes. It does not, however, do justice to the organized and
organic quality of our respondents' accounts of their cases. These ac-
counts make it clear that the respondents were not simply picking and
choosing tactics from among discrete categories of intervention. For
a core group of respondents, strategic choice appears to have been
driven by an underlying "blue print" or cognitive schema.
Given the small sample and the impressionistic nature of the
data, this notion of conflict intervention schema is clearly provisional.
However, the testimony of the interviews is consistent with research on
schema in other studies of the third party role in conflict,41 and with
more extensive literatures in social cognition,42 decision-making un-
der difficult, 'non-routine situations,4" and reflective case studies of
professional practices as diverse as teaching and organizational con-
sulting.44 Broadly speaking, in these reports a schema functions like a
"script," albeit frequently one which is only partly conscious, which
directs the attention and guides the behavior of the actor, particularly
at important decision-making "choice points."
41. Kenneth Kressel et al., The Settlement Orientation vs. The Problem-Solving Style In Cus-
tody Mediation, 50 THEJ. OF SOCIAL ISSUES 67, 67-84 (1994); see Sheppard et al., supra note 6,
at 186.
42. See SUSAN FisKE & SHELLEY TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION, 96-179 (1991).
43. See KLEIN, supra note 7, at 15-30.
44. See DONALD A. SCHON, THE REFLECTIVE TURN: CASE STUDIES IN AND ON EDUCA-
TIONAL PRACTICE (1991).
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Earlier, we briefly described one respondent's schema for estab-
lishing rapport.45 The schema we refer to here are considerably more
encompassing. Four such schema can be identified from the inter-
views, corresponding to the types of conflicts discussed by our respon-
dents. Schema can be identified for managing interpersonal conflict,
organizational problem-solving, end-of-life conflict, and "crisis" griev-
ing in a medical emergency. 46
In general, these are highly activist and directive conceptions.
They are also implicit: None of the respondents spoke of their
"schema" in so many words. The operation of the schema also appear
to be partly "automatic," in so far as certain cues rapidly trigger a
course of action with little or no conscious reflection.
We illustrate the notion of conflict management schema with two
examples: one from the organizational domain, the other from crisis
grieving. In each case the schema is characterized by ideas about what
a good process of conflict management looks like, what can impede
that process, and a clear conception of the third party role and its
objectives.
A. A Schema for Organizational Problem-Solving: The Missing
Medical Supplies
The respondent was an administrator of an outpatient depart-
ment who was asked by a hospital executive to serve as the facilitator
of an inter-departmental task force to improve hospital procedures for
keeping track of medical supplies. As in most other hospitals in
America, supplies of various kinds are in chronically short supply.
The elements of the schema guiding his actions in this long and com-
plex case can be described as follows:
1. A good process is defined by the logical steps of good prob-
lem-solving of any kind. In sequence, this means beginning with a
careful fact-gathering stage, in which the current procedures for deal-
ing with supplies is identified, both in this hospital and in other hospi-
tals; this information is then used to develop a pilot plan, which is
presented to relevant units in the hospital for comments and sugges-
tions. The pilot is then implemented and carefully evaluated. The
evaluation results are used to formulate a final, improved procedure.
45. Id. at 45-46.
46. No clear schema emerged for treatment planning conflicts, perhaps because our
respondents in those cases did not serve as mediators, but as one of the disputants or as
adjuncts to the problem-solving efforts of others.
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2. The major obstacles to good process are the penchant in orga-
nizations for premature problem-solving, which cuts short or bypasses
the all important fact-gathering stage; the normal resistance of depart-
ments to assuming accountability for a new procedure; and the ten-
dency to ignore key stake holders.
3. The role of the team leader is to facilitate a sound problem-
solving process and to keep it on track when obstacles arise. This
means preventing premature closure by insisting on a thorough fact-
gathering stage; identifying all the relevant stake holders and inviting
them into the process; bringing people back to the table when there is
evidence that the pilot plan is not working and people are trying to
evade accountability; and being a voice against the press of self-inter-
est. Thus, the respondent's comments to the task force when the pilot
project they had agreed to fell apart:
I laid out our initial commitment to the process and what the
process was supposed to be. Then I opened the table to what
had fallen apart: "Where had we all failed? What weren't we
doing that we agreed to? We had the commitment that this
was going to be the solution what we all came up with. Now
what's happening?"
His conception of his role comes partly from his formal training
in organizational development and partly from experience in the hos-
pital. At critical moments he relies on his intuition to guide him. For
example, when members of the task force wanted to skip immediately
to problem-solving his intuition told him that this was a mistake:
All they wanted to do is put a band-aid on and go on to do
other stuff. It would have been so easy to do that. We all
wanted to do that!
INTERVIEWER: Why didn't you?
RESPONDENT: Just experience. This issue had been here
for years and years.
B. A Schema for "Crisis" Grieving in a Medical Emergency: The Gang in
the SICU
We have already described this case in connection with various
illustrations of tactical behavior. The underlying schema of interven-
tion underlying these behaviors can be described thusly:
1. A good process is defined by the intersection of two concerns:
maintenance of control and providing an outlet for the powerful emo-
tions connected with grieving. The first step is to ascertain the extent
of the threat which the gang on the SICU poses to the delivery of care
and the maintenance of safety. That information is acquired rapidly
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through visual cues at the site (e.g., the pacing and yelling gang mem-
bers). Once the threat is determined to be significant, control be-
comes the central issue. Control is established by providing a focused
but circumscribed outlet for the powerful emotions of pain and loss
being experienced by the gang members (i.e., by gathering the gang
members in the waiting room to acknowledge their right to be told
what is happening to their comrade; the sudden emergence in the
respondent's mind of the "two-by-two" plan for farewells; and the gang
members' immediate exit from the hospital).
2. The major obstacles to good process are fear (that the gang
will turn violent) and the concomitant press to use force (hospital se-
curity), a move that would only set off an explosion. This central reali-
zation is triggered instantly by an encounter with another nurse
manager:
There was another manager out here in the hallway. She
had a history of not managing crises or conflict. I've seen
her escalate situations .... I already had a history with this
nurse manager and to see her on the scene, I knew was not
going to help things. She was already walking around telling
me how she was going to call security and it was all going to
be very confrontational - all of it. That was going to push
buttons. These were, in my opinion, teenagers that were go-
ing to need a place to vent or a way to vent. If you didn't
calm them down and let them deal with it either by crying or
talking about it, you were just going to make a very labile
group angry.
3. The role of the "mediator" is to orchestrate the grieving pro-
cess in a way that is controlled, efficient, and takes into account the
needs of other affected parties whose cooperation is essential (the
family of the dying gang member; the SICU nurses). This is a highly
directive role which is the result of the respondent having had much
prior experience in similar situations (e.g., dealing with large num-
bers of police officers in the ER rushing to comfort a wounded fellow
officer) and is made possible by the ability to establish authority
firmly, but without undue force, and to rapidly formulate a plan that
is responsive to the central emotional issue.
VIII. THE IMPACT OF FAMILY AND WORK ON SHAPING EXPERTISE IN
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
Because our informants represent a highly select and important
resource for the hospital, we were interested in knowing about the
personal experiences that might have contributed to their expertise
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and interested them in the role of "peacemaker." Toward the end of
the interview respondents were asked if they knew of anything in their
personal history that had helped make them esteemed mangers of
conflict in the hospital. The answers to this question indicate that
certain family and work experiences were critically important. These
sources imbued our informants with a small, but cardinal number of
useful skills.
A. How to Make Decisions and Formulate "a Plan" Under Stress.
We have noted previously the view of several respondents that the
"culture" of emergency medicine fosters both denial of conflict and
overly aggressive strategies for managing conflict. Nonetheless, re-
spondents with emergency room experiences credited it with provid-
ing invaluable training in managing conflict under stressful
conditions. A trauma nurse commented:
I think the emergency room played a big part in how I devel-
oped to deal with conflict - this emergency room. You
would have to know the emergency room. It is extremely
busy, volatile. It goes 24 hours a day. In my earlier years
down there you really had very little structure or oversight by
management and attending physicians; so nurses really
played an integral role in how decisions were made. The
physicians who rotated through relied on the nurses to know
what they needed to do and what the routines should be.
You clinically had to be very astute. The conflict was always
coming in through the street. You had up to 10 nurses on
any given shift plus probably about five physicians, so you
had a lot of different personalities that worked together in
the same room. It really presented itself very much like a
MASH unit. You needed instant response. There could be a
bus crash and you could go from only having 15 or 20 pa-
tients in the ER to having 40 or 50 patients. You learned how
to prioritize and decision-making, and how to delegate those
ideas to people and get them to do it.
Another respondent with significant experience in emergency
medicine made similar observations. She also hinted at the limita-
tions of ER experience for conflicts with more extended time-frames.
"People that are in the emergency medical profession are very good at
categorizing things and managing a crisis; triaging things, prioritizing,
delegating duties. We're very poor at [long-range planning]. We can
do disaster planning, but not strategic planning. We're good at the
incident, the crisis situation."
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B. How to Control One's Emotions and Channel them Effectively.
Four informants discussed critical losses they had experienced in
their own lives or key figures from their families who modeled certain
ways of being that made them more empathic to the pain of others or
more patient and self controlled in difficult circumstances. A respon-
dent whose mother died when she was 12, and who later lost a baby
who was stillborn, said of her ability to manage angry people in non-
confrontational ways:
It makes you aware of your own behavior and why you do
certain things, and I realized that everyone has things in
their life that affect how they respond and that they can't
control .... It just gives me an understanding that some-
times you can go in the back door and maybe have a better
relationship.
Two respondents felt that their ability to control their anger also
had its roots in early, albeit very different, family experiences:
I rarely get angry .... I see a lot of people get angry and it's
probably pretty healthy. I never really get angry at work.
INTERVIEWER: Is that an asset to you?
RESPONDENT: I think so. I see plenty of people who do
get angry. I have "lost it;" maybe somebody pushed my but-
ton, but it's pretty rare. I'm really pretty patient and I think I
learned that from my grandmother. She was my Presbyte-
rian grandmother who converted to become a Catholic and
became the best Catholic in the family. She just had this
marvelous patience. There was probably plenty of conflict
going on around her and family dynamics and everything.
But she managed it well and I think I learned it because I
spent a lot of time with her.
One thing I've learned is never personalize the response
from other people. It is difficult to do, but you have to do
that because you are always representing your organization;
and secondly, you're not supposed to act like them. It's just
part of me. I've been inculcated that you do not act up be-
cause somebody else is acting up .... I learned that in my
home. My brother's a very argumentative man to this day.
My response to him is to look him straight in the face, as if to
say, "I don't hear you." He would get very angry with me
because I would not argue, but he would walk away
ultimately.
Another informant talked about how studying the grieving pro-
cess and developing a satisfying personal approach to life had aided
her in dealing with the pain of others.
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Many years ago I had the absolute privilege of spending the
summer with Kubler-Ross.47 It changed my life. It was one of
those "aha" experiences .... We spent most of the summer
dealing with our own stuff. So when you face it that closely -
your own stuff - you're not afraid to relate to somebody
else's stuff. I don't panic in the face of outrageous emotions.
I don't get threatened very easily .... There's very few "if
only's" in who I am and how I live. There isn't a whole lot I
didn't do when I wanted to. I'm heavy into "I want it now."
I'd like to hang around this earth a lot longer but I don't
have a lot of regrets. That kind of makes you open to other
people's stuff. There are days when I have to mop up a lot of
grief, a lot of pain, but I can go home and leave it here.
That's a skill you have to learn. If you take the stuff home,
you can't come back.., so the grief stuff is very important to
me. I guess people don't see a lot of conflict in grief but
there is. A lot of conflicted feelings, a lot of "if onlys."
C. The Capacity to be Respectful and to Respect the Autonomy of Others
Three respondents spoke of learning how to respect the "bound-
aries" of others from experiences in their families of origin. For one it
was being the youngest of seven children. Another had a mother who
was paraplegic for many years and who was dying with metastatic can-
cer. She was determined to die a dignified death and made him
aware of her wishes. This helped him be respectful of the autonomy
of others, especially in end of life conflicts.
A third respondent commented wryly about the role of family in
regard to the hospital's formal efforts at teaching staff how to interact
with patients:
I had this eight hour training where I had someone tell me
that I should smile, make eye contact and "yadda yadda." I
should do all these wonderful things - these new and excit-
ing techniques. I said, "This is what my mother taught me
when I was a little child - 'Thank you,' 'Yes,' 'No,' 'How can
I help you'?" I was basically taught that as a child.
IX. CONCLUSION
This investigation provides a portrait of one hospital's conflicts
and its struggles to cope with them. We make no claim that our find-
ings are necessarily representative of the conflict dynamics in other
47. The psychiatrist Kubler-Ross did path breaking work in field of the psychology of
death and dying.
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types of health care institutions or settings. Even on its own terms,
our portrait is inevitably incomplete. We have seen the institution
through the eyes of people who know it well, but whose own subjectiv-
ity and position must inevitably color and, in some measure, distort
the reality. Indeed, we cannot even be certain that all of our respon-
dents qualify as bona fide conflict management experts or that this
exhausts the ranks of those within the hospital who might so qualify.
Nonetheless, collectively, the respondents have given us an ex-
tremely valuable and provocative look at the manner in which large
scale social, economic, and medical changes are roiling the waters of
an important type of health care institution - the teaching hospital
serving an inner city population. The interviews also describe how
that institution and some of its most creative and dedicated profes-
sionals are struggling to navigate those waters. We summarize these
matters with some observations about the hospital, the unofficial man-
agers of its conflicts, and the training and research needs related to
both.
The hospital in which our respondents work emerges in this col-
lectively drawn portrait as an institution being buffeted by significant
interpersonal, organizational and inter-institutional conflicts. The
primary causes of these conflicts are not "difficult people." Although
physicians were often identified as culprits, and though there was an
inclination to "personalize" the explanations for many of the conflicts
we were told about, it is clear that dysfunctional conflicts within the
hospital and between the hospital and other institutions are primarily
a function of powerful, interacting social forces. These include as-
pects of medical and nursing practice and culture, organizational dy-
namics, the needs and characteristics of the hospital's patient
population, and above all, the hospital's declining economic base.
In the accounts of our respondents, the hospital appears as an
institution that is ambivalent or uncertain about how to manage its
conflicts.48 On the one hand, the hospital provides no highly visible,
well-advertised places for handling conflicts in a non-adversarial man-
ner. With the exception of the role of the bioethics committee in end
of life disputes, formal conflict management is done primarily
through adversarial structures provided by labor-management con-
48. The hospital's ambivalence about conflict and at least some of its characteristic
defects and strength in this regard appear to be common in many types of organizations.
MAx J. BAZERMAN & RovJ. LEWICKI, NEGOTIATING IN ORGANIZATIONS (1983); DEBORAH M.
KOLB &JEAN M. BARTUNEK, HIDDEN CONFLICT IN ORGANIZATIONS: UNCOVERING BEHIND-THE-
SCENES DISPUTES (1992). Given the unique responsibilities of the hospital, the similarities
to other types of organization may be of only modest comfort.
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tracts or federal or state regulations. There is no ombuds office, no
trained, widely available mediators, no developed mechanisms for de-
fining and managing conflict in a non-adversarial way.49 Conflict
avoidance appears to be the norm for handling the daily irritations of
work in the hospital, even about important matters of professional
judgment or patient care.
The hospital's approach to conflict does have a more positive
side. Although it may lack developed formal structures for mediation
and mutual problem solving, its informal vehicles for so doing are no-
table. Not the least of these, of course, are the respondents them-
selves. As we have noted, they are a hidden but valuable human
resource; serving at the least as an important safety-valve for anger and
frustration and at best, as a means for managing change and for orga-
nizational learning.
There is also the hospital's hidden "anatomy" of conflict manage-
ment: the committees, task forces, medical boards and inter-depart-
ment meetings whose ostensible purposes are about medical decision-
making or organizational "best practices," but which also appears to
provide useful opportunities for people to raise and constructively
confront important differences - especially people like our respon-
dents who have the skill and good sense to create, use, and mold
them.
There is also good and bad news about the unofficial managers of
hospital conflict. The good news, apart from what we have already
said, is that despite the fact that most of them have had limited formal
training in conflict management, their approaches to dealing with
conflict are, at least in broad outline, remarkably similar to those of
professional mediators with years of training and experience.
Some of the respondents also appear to possess relatively sophisti-
cated cognitive schema of intervention. The fact that these schema
are often implicit and triggered automatically at critical moments in
the unfolding of conflict suggests an efficiency and competence that
has been found to be the hallmark of expertise in other challenging
domains of life. Interestingly enough, given our initial interest in the
role of the non-professional, emergent mediator, the study also tells
us that there is more than one way to provide a useful service as a
conflict manger: The role of impassioned and skilled advocate, or co-
ordinator of or consultant to others can also be critical.
49. AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, MANAGING CONFLICT IN HEALTH CARE ORGANIZA-
TIONS (1995); K. Slaikeu, Designing Dispute Resolution Systems in the Health Care Industry, 5
NEGOTIATION J. 395, 398-399 (1989); see WILLIAM L. URY et. al., GETFING DISPUTES RE_
SOLVED: DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO CUT THE COSTS OF CONFLICT (1988).
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The bad news is that, with the exception of the end of life inter-
veners, who can rely on a developed professional framework for con-
flict management and are accorded explicit recognition for their
efforts, many of our respondents seem uncertain or ambivalent about
their roles as conflict mangers. At times, this seems to be a reflection
of the hospital's own ambivalence, and the concomitant lack of formal
recognition or support they get for their efforts. Several of our re-
spondents, for example, expressed surprise that they were regarded by
others as skilled conflict managers or dubious that they had any spe-
cial knowledge in that domain. The trauma nurse who described her
intervention in The Gang in the SICU began the interview with just such
a disclaimer. By the end of the interview, to her surprise and appar-
ent gratification, she admitted that she now realized she knew more
about conflict than she had realized.
There is also the matter of pressure tactics. "Torquemada's Law"
was popular, especially in the mediation of interpersonal and organi-
zational conflict. Respondents felt obliged to rely on it for important
reasons, but the results were often mixed. While pressure tactics seem
popular among managers in other types of organizations and useful
for producing immediate compliance,5" there is good reason to worry
about their long-term consequences, 51 especially in an institution
whose avowed purpose is nurturance and caring.
The informal mediation of conflict at the hospital also appears to
be largely "woman's work." Three-quarters of our conflict experts
were women, an over representation in the sphere of conflict manage-
ment that appears typical in organizational life. 5' There are many dif-
ferent explanations for this fact, including the social expectation that
women are more skilled than men at the interpersonal "arts." But the
disquieting theory has also been put forward that the prevalence of
women as informal organizational mediators, and the fact that such
activities often go unrecognized and unnoticed, suggests that behind
- the - scenes peacemaking is a "devalued and gendered activity. 53
From a purely pragmatic view, the interviews suggests that health
care professionals and health care managers might derive considera-
ble benefit from more training in the management of health care con-
50. Blair H. Sheppard, Managers at Inquisitors: Some Lessons from the Law, in NEGOTIATING
IN ORGANIZATIONS, 193, 203-04 (1983).
51. Jeffrey Z. Rubin, The Use of Third Parties in Organizations: A Critical Response, in NEGO-
TIATING IN ORGANIZATIONS, 214, 218 (Max H. Bazerman & RoyJ. Lewicki, eds. 1983); see
Kressel & Pruitt, supra note 4 at 418-20.
52. ARLIE R. HOCHSCHILD, THE MANAGED HEART: COMMERCIALIZATION OF HUMAN FEEL-
ING (1983).
53. Kolb & Bartunek, supra note 48, at 88.
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flict. The findings provide some hints about what such training might
consist of and who should be taught. The "who" most certainly in-
cludes physicians, whose overuse of strategies of avoidance and aggres-
sion was a major theme (along with considerable skepticism that
physicians would be interested in such training). Other prospective
candidates for training may be in the area of emergency medicine,
where there are indications that denial and over reliance on coercive
tactics may be all too common.. Two of the respondents with manage-
rial responsibilities in emergency medicine were particularly receptive
to getting such training for their staffs.
The "what" of training should not be limited to the handling of
interpersonal conflicts, but should include material focused on con-
flicts over treatment planning and organizational conflicts, since these
appear to be commonly occurring types of disputes. Mediation train-
ing for end of life conflicts is already a developed professional activity
in bioethics and bereavement training, but may need more wide-
spread dissemination.
Training should also be built around the notion of cognitive
schema. The focus on schema would appear to be a more useful and
important didactic tool than a mere enumeration and rehearsal of
discrete strategic skills; it appears likely that it is the possession of the
schema that makes the effective marshalling of those skills possible. It
would also seem important to emphasize that there are different
schema for different types of hospital conflict. Based on the current
findings, while there are at least three key schematic elements for any
type of conflict - the nature of a good process of conflict manage-
ment, awareness of the primary obstacles to good process, and a clear
conception of the third party role and its objectives - the nature of
those elements is likely to be different from one type of conflict to
another.
A final word about research. Like any in-depth, exploratory
study, this investigation raises as many questions as it answers. More
systematic empirical work is clearly needed in a number of important
areas. For example, we could use considerably more study of what we
have been calling the hidden "anatomy" of the organizational re-
sponse to conflict - the internal boards and committees of the hospi-
tal in which conflicts often surface. What are the most influential of
these venues? How do they work? How effective are they in regulat-
ing conflict and how well do they permit less powerful organizational
voice., to be heard?
We could also use more in-depth study of particular types of con-
flict, especially conflicts among physicians over treatment planning.
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Only one such conflict was included in this investigation, yet in some
way this is the type of conflict that is most directly connected to the
substantive core of what hospitals do.
The concept of conflict schema is also in need of more systematic
work. Can such schema be reliably identified with more objective em-
pirical methods? If so, how important are they in distinguishing be-
tween the skilled conflict manager and the novice or the less skilled?
Do different types of health care professionals have the same or differ-
ent schema for handling conflict? Better and worse grasps of the
schema they do have?
Finally, there is a need for research on the relationship between
the ways in which conflict is dealt with and outcomes such as the qual-
ity of patient care, patient compliance with treatment, and staff mo-
rale and functioning. We have assumed that good conflict
management contributes directly and positively to good health care
outcomes. There is a need to test this proposition.
On the whole, however, we come away from this investigation
with very deep respect for the important role our respondents play in
the delivery of health care under often arduous and rapidly changing
conditions and the important personal and social values which their
efforts as conflict managers often express.
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